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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to critically examine the potential of Egypt’s central 
Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
therefore contribute in boosting the country’s economic development.  
In quest of achieving this objective, the research applies a qualitative methodological 
approach of a single case study analysis, where it investigates several legislative and 
institutional elements to understand the extent to which the structure of the General 
Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) enables it to perform its role as the 
national agency responsible for investment promotion. The analysis explains various 
aspects that define the effectiveness of GAFI’s structure, such as the authority level, 
tools, degree of political autonomy, and the different promotional functions performed.  
The detailed scrutiny of different organizational and functional elements reveals that the 
overall structure of GAFI does not contribute to its likelihood of being an effective 
agency, and therefore exposes its limited role in promoting and facilitating private 
investments. The findings explain how GAFI’s legal status accounts for weakening its 
structure and further articulate how the Authority lags behind in performing the main 
promotional functions of image building, investment generation, investor servicing and 
facilitation, and policy advocacy; all of which that influence Egypt’s ability to attract 
foreign investment, enhance local economy and guarantee better linkages to global 
economy. Thus, the research offers some recommendations to help policy makers adopt 
better mechanisms that could enhance the performance of GAFI, such as, ensuring the 
separation between GAFI’s role as a regulator and executor on one side, and its role as 
promoter and facilitator on the other side. 
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Chapter One:  
Study Overview 
I. Introduction 
 
There is consensus on the importance of investment as a determinant of economic 
growth, especially in the developing world, where private sector is the largest employer, 
providing almost 90% of jobs (Stampeni et al., 2013). However, low levels of private 
sector productive investments appear to be a major obstacle to economic growth in 
developing countries (Saif and Ghoneim, 2013).  
Successful international experiences have shown that creating a stable and 
conducive environment for business and investment through progressive macroeconomic 
policies and structural policy reform can lead to high levels of investments. However, 
many researchers (Moore and Schmitz, 2008; Rodrik, 2005; and Hausmann et al., 2007) 
have stressed that regulatory reform should not be the only focus of policy and research. 
They emphasized that an equal focus should also be given to the importance of 
circumstances in the different countries, where institutions play a pivotal role in 
responding to investors’ needs, and in shaping the dynamics of private investments.  
Government intervention in economy through investment promotion was firstly 
drawn attention to by Wells and Wint, as a particular type of marketing activity that must 
be carried out by governments seeking to pull in more foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(Trnik, 2007). Over the past three decades, it can be found that investment promotion is 
highly associated with significant FDI growth (Figure 1). But, even though there is a 
spread of national Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) - seeking to stimulate growth 
and development by offering investment incentives, investor services and other means to 
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encourage investors and draw more FDI-, the problem of low investment levels still 
exists in developing countries (Casey, 2013). 
Figure (1): Global FDI Inflows by Group of Economies 2005-2015, and Projections, 2016-
2018, (Bil. US$) 
 
  Source: UNCTAD. (2016). 
 
Moving in tandem with the global economy, Egypt has moved from a public 
sector dominated economy to a private sector led economy with the announcement of an 
open door policy for foreign investment and markets in the 1970’s, and created the 
General Authority For Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), as a dedicated national IPA to 
promote and attract FDI in Egypt.  
In the past 15 years, private investments have become a key contributor to the 
growth of the Egyptian economy. Between 2002 and 2014, the total implemented 
investments have nearly tripled to reach EGP 265 billion, which is equivalent to an 
average annual growth rate of almost 26% (CBE, 2014; MoPMAR, 2015). Furthermore, 
private investments made up 62% of the total implemented investments in 2014, 
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compared to only 49% in 2003 (CBE, 2014; MoPMAR, 2015). However, the levels of 
private investments have declined sharply post the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and the 
transitional periods, Egypt has been going through. Many impediments have resulted 
from political, economic, legal and judicial instability, resulting in a continued 
deterioration of Egypt’s rank for several consecutive years in the Global Competitiveness 
Reports of the World Economic Forum. A significant decline was observed in 
“Macroeconomic Environment” and “Institutions” pillars, in addition to the strength of 
investor protection (WEF, 2015). The growth rate was limited to 2%, the government 
budget deficit reached unprecedented levels recording EGP 166.7 billion for 2012 (MoF, 
2013), and FDI inflows, one of the main sources for foreign currency, has significantly 
decreased by 19% between 2012 and 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014). Even though Egypt 
regained some stability after 2013, FDI levels remain very low. 
Although academic debates concentrated on the low levels of private investments 
in the past years, the discussions and solutions offered to developing countries were only 
limited to improving the investment climate by focusing on regulatory frameworks 
(Abdel-Latif and Schmitz, 2011). Existing researches give less attention to IPAs and their 
characteristics that account for effectiveness in attracting more FDI, and the dynamics of 
private investment resulting from institutional differences continue to be under-
researched.  
Focusing on institutional differences, best practices and rigorous studies have 
verified a number of elements that highly influence the capacity of IPAs to operate 
effectively and in turn attract more FDI. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to highlight 
the institutionalized approach to attract private investments by focusing on the structure 
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of Egypt’s national IPA; GAFI to explore whether it enables or impedes performing its 
promotional role and hence contribute to the likelihood of attracting more FDI. This will 
take place through examining the agency’s organizational and functional elements, 
besides investigating the current regulatory framework that governs its operations. 
II. Research Questions, Scope, and Importance of the Study 
a. Research Questions 
The focal research question for this thesis is: 
To what extent do the structure and legislative framework of GAFI enable it to 
perform its role as the national Investment Promotion Agency of Egypt? 
The research tries to answer this main question by centering on the main 
institutional and legislative frameworks of GAFI and investigating how they 
influence the significance of its role in attracting and facilitating private investments 
in Egypt. The following are the research sub-questions. 
1. To what extent does the New Investment Law No. 17/2015 affect the operation of 
GAFI? 
2. How does the organizational capacity of GAFI influence its ability to act as an 
effective IPA? 
3. How does GAFI perform its role in investment promotion? 
4. How far do GAFI’s organizational characteristics affect its institutional functions? 
b. Importance of the Study 
The importance of this study stems from three reasons; first, there is a dearth of 
academic research on the dynamics of private investment and institutional capacities that 
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control the ability of countries to attain successful reforms and increase private 
investment levels. Most of the academic debates that focus on low levels of private 
investments in developing countries are only limited to discussions of improving the 
regulatory frameworks and offering standardized recommendations presented by 
international agencies. This study contributes to the literature, by offering an in-depth 
institutional analysis to one of the developing countries IPAs. Hence, it fills a gap with 
regards to institutional differences in attracting investment. 
Second, the majority of studies assessing the performance of IPAs used empirical 
methods, while this is a qualitative study. Therefore, it contributes to the knowledge of 
investment promotion agencies in developing countries using a qualitative approach, by 
selecting Egypt’s IPA as a case study, and providing in depth information on its role and 
institutional functions. 
The third reason pertains to the relative novelty of Investment Law No. 17/2015, 
and the attempt to analyze it, with regards to the prerogatives it offers to GAFI, which in 
turn determine its powers and influence its performance. 
c. Scope of the Study 
The research entails providing a picture of GAFI as an institution, identifying the 
main obstacles hindering it from performing its promotional role, whether they are 
organizational, functional, or legal constraints. The scope of the study involves: 
o Investigating the current governing investment law, and accordingly explain the 
prerogatives and powers given to GAFI. 
o Investigating the organizational elements that influence GAFI’s structure, and 
therefore its promotional mandates. 
 13 
o Analyzing GAFI’s current institutional functions based on IPAs’ best practices 
and explaining how they are influenced by the organizational elements. 
Based of the analysis, the research also seeks to offer recommendations that will 
further help policy-makers to close the implementation gaps between laws and practice 
and enable them to formulate policies and adopt better mechanisms that contribute 
positively to the investment environment in Egypt. 
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Chapter Two: 
Literature Review on Investment Promotion 
 
This chapter will present and summarize the current state of knowledge on 
investment promotion and its agencies. It will begin with the important role of institutions 
in attracting private investments; followed by IPAs in particular, discussing their 
structures and functions in detail; moving on to the importance of the legislative context; 
and concluding with a summary on the existing studies on investment promotion. 
It is worth noting that most of the literature on investment promotion and IPAs are 
driven from few international organizations; namely the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service (FIAS), especially from the profound contribution of Louis Wells, Alvin Wint 
(1990; 2000), Jacques Morisset, and Kelly Andrews-Johnson (2004); and Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). This can be attributed to the practical nature of this domain, 
where most of the existent researches were aimed at assessing the effectiveness of IPAs, 
or enhancing its work and other investment-related policies. Even though, such 
researches and reports were not meant for academic purposes, they serve as foundations 
for carrying out further academic research. 
I. Institutions and Investment Promotion 
 
Governments usually link achieving higher economic growth with attracting more 
FDI. Therefore, many efforts were exerted from host country governments to reach this 
objective, including opening up to market economy, granting incentives to investors from 
source countries, and improving macro-economic and micro-economic conditions (Trnik, 
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2007). Yet, these efforts did not necessarily assure achieving the projected FDI levels and 
thus opened the gate for more efforts to take place in a more institutionalized approach. 
Within this context, originated the concept of investment promotion, emerging from a 
greater literature on the role of government in steering the economy, where two 
fundamental contending approaches lie; the neoclassical versus the interventionist 
paradigms.  
The neoclassical approach to investment promotion is mainly based on the 
assumption that governments of host countries should only focus on creating good 
investment climates and change the incentive structure. It considers this as the principal 
mean, by which investors will automatically be intrigued to seek the most advantageous 
investment opportunities (Lim, 2008; Morisset & Andrews-Johnson, 2004). In contrast, 
the interventionist approach argues that, this role is insufficient, due to the existing 
market failures resulting from information gaps, believing that intervention is necessary 
to help address these failures and yield favorable results in terms of attracting more 
foreign investments (Morisset & Andrews-Johnson, 2004).  
Following the interventionist approach, the role of institutions in attracting and 
enhancing investment, either domestic or foreign has been discussed widely, as it is 
believed that institutional quality influences economic growth partly through the amount 
of investments attracted (Valeriani and Peluso, 2011; Buchanan, Le, and Rishi, 2012). 
North and Weingast (1989) discussed the role of political institutions in particular and the 
importance of an existing system of checks and balances that can favorably affect 
investment by permitting governments to be more credible and commit to not engaging in 
ex-post opportunism with investors or exposing them to other risks. They also pointed at 
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greater variability in levels of private investment within a set of observations in different 
countries, where checks and balances were low.  
Dixit (2009) discussed how certain types of government institutions help markets 
and business transactions by providing physical and organizational infrastructure, such as 
property rights protection, contracts enforcement, and collective action facilitation. 
Similarly, Dumludag (2009) has referred to these institutions as of economic nature and 
which “determine the economic rules of the game”(p.18), and North (1990) elaborated on 
the role of these institutions in creating order, reducing uncertainty in the exchange of 
goods and capital, and helping to determine transaction and production costs; concluding 
that institutions simply determine the feasibility and profitability of partaking any 
economic activity and thus lead to more private investment. 
Thus, countries establish investment promotion entities to employ promotional 
techniques and carry out these objectives. Anderson and Sutherland (2015) add that such 
entities are considered a useful policy tool, because they provide information and services 
to foreign investors and thereby reduce the transaction cost of investing in a particular 
location. 
II. Investment Promotion Agencies and FDI 
 
IPAs are institutions through which governments carry out activities to attract FDI 
inflows (Wells and Wint, 2000). These promotional activities comprise a wide range of 
actions that vary from conducting investment seminars and missions for source countries, 
participating in exhibitions, and engaging in advertising and marketing efforts, to 
providing matching services for prospective investors with domestic partners, facilitating 
the process of obtaining permits and approvals, in addition to offering services and 
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consultations to committed investors, whose projects are already in operation (Wells and 
Wint, 2000).  
Some agencies extend their activities to grant different types of incentives to 
foreign investors aiming at more FDI influxes (Lim, 2008), In contrast, Whyte et al. 
(2011) stated that, there is a weak correlation between investment promotion and the 
agencies responsible for performing both tasks for investment promotion and investment 
regulation. This view was reinforced by Miskinis and Byrka (2014), in which they 
indicated that the more an IPA is engaged in regulatory functions and activities, such as 
incentives and negotiation concessions, the less efficient and successful it is in attracting 
investments. Therefore, there is a wide consensus among the best practices and 
evaluations (UNCTAD, 1997; Wells and Wint, 2001; Morisset and Andrews-Johnson; 
2004; MIGA, 2004) on grouping the basic promotional activities and functions of IPAs 
into four main core categories, ‘national image building’; ‘investment generation’; 
‘investor facilitation and servicing’; and ‘policy advocacy’.  Table (1) summarizes the 
main activities under each of the four IPA core promotion functions. 
Table (1) Core Functions of Investment Promotion 
 
 
National Image Building 
 Disseminating information materials through several creative mediums. 
 Participating in investment exhibitions.  
 Conducting general investment missions to source countries. 
 Holding information seminars on investment opportunities. 
 
Investment Generation 
 Targeting specific investors, sectors or firms. 
 Engaging in direct mail or telemarketing campaigns.  
 Conducting specific industry/sector based investment missions. 
 Holding tailored information seminars in source countries. 
 Involving embassies abroad in investment promotion. 
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Investment Facilitation and Services 
 Pre Investment Support 
o Handling investment inquiries. 
o Highlighting the sectoral investment opportunities. 
o Providing information on investment projects. 
o Providing incentives for foreign investors. 
 Support in Getting Started 
o Full assistance with site selection, documentation and applications. 
o Providing requested information until the start of operations.  
o Coordinating with the concerned authorities. 
o Matchmaking service. 
 Providing Aftercare Services 
o Following up and monitoring an already accomplished investment project. 
o Investment retention and expansion. 
o Handling complaints by investors. 
 
Policy Advocacy 
 Participating in policy task forces.  
 Drafting laws or policy recommendations.  
 Reporting investors’ perceptions, opinions and comments. 
Source: Adapted from Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) 
1. Structural Approaches for an Investment Promotion Agency 
 
Beside their promotional functions, institutional structures and reporting 
mechanisms of IPAs are found to be key to their efficiency (Wells and Wint, 2000; 
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004; Miskinis and Byrka, 2014).  Wells and Wint 
(2000) have observed three different types of organization for establishing investment 
promotion agencies; a government-controlled agency; a private-sector agency; or a quasi-
governmental (semi-autonomous) structure. In their view, investment promotion 
activities considerably vary in nature than the usual conventional government practices of 
controlling, regulating, and exercising authority. They are more of marketing approaches 
closer to the private sector style of business, which require flexibility, responsiveness, 
and continuous communication with private sector. 
Therefore, among these three structures, Wells and Wint (2000) suggest that a 
semi-governmental structure is the best, because purely governmental structures would 
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lack the adequate skills required to carry out effective investment promotion activities. In 
the same time, a private-sector structure would be challenged to fulfill those tasks 
demanding governmental control, such as granting permits and approvals or any other 
government requirements.  
Accordingly, they suggest that a semi-governmental structure benefits from the 
advantages of both, the purely governmental and independent private structures. In other 
words, they still function under the government’s oversight by reporting to it. Yet, they 
are not part of the government structure, and are not bound to its burdens and 
bureaucracy when it comes to acquiring the necessary skills and expertise for handling 
the promotional activities. Alongside the professional business skills, they would also 
have the needed authority capabilities and direct access to government, required to 
expedite the investment-servicing processes and successfully perform the IPA key 
functions. Relatedly, Miskinis and Byrka considered “IPAs with quasi-government status 
and private sector representation are performing better than IPAs that are incorporated as 
part of a governmental body” (2014, p. 43).  
Furthermore, Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) have found that FDI 
attraction is influenced by the way IPAs perform business and by their internal 
characteristics of legal status, funding and mandates. However, for the success of any 
IPA, what matters the most in these characteristics is the degree of political visibility and 
private sector participation it enjoys. Both researchers have found a positive correlation 
between the agency effectiveness and when the agency has a supervisory board with 
representatives of private sector, and has a direct reporting relationship to a country’s 
president or its prime minister.  
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2. Promotional Functions and Attracting FDI 
 
Image Building is about constructing a perception of a country as a favorable 
location for investment, as well as correcting weak or negative views about the country 
that could stand as an impediment against attracting FDI. Investment generation is mainly 
about targeting of specific firms, investors, and sectors for a more focused investment. 
Investor facilitation and servicing involves assisting investors with their businesses 
during the different stages, from pre-investment support and helping them get started to 
aftercare services provision. Policy advocacy includes activities through which the IPA 
encourages and backs any policy changes that aim at improving the quality of the 
investment climate. This function is also concerned with incorporating the views of the 
private sector regarding this matter (Wells and Wint, 2000; Morisset and Andrews-
Johnson, 2004; Sirr et al., 2012). 
a. Image Building 
Constructing a positive national image constitutes an indispensable ingredient for 
investment promotion. It is the primary function of IPAs that paves the way for the 
effectiveness of the other three core IPA functions. That’s why evidence suggests that 
IPAs put greater emphasis in their promotional efforts on image building and investment 
generation (Sirr et al., 2012; Wells &Wint, 2000). Generally, image building precedes 
investment generation and uses marketing techniques to develop a favorable perception 
among potential investors. Activities under image building efforts frequently include 
advertising, public relations (PR) campaigns, media campaigns, participating in 
investment exhibitions and investor forums, conducting investment missions maintaining 
relationships with journalists and business partners, and developing the IPA’s website to 
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disseminate accurate information to the general public and prospective investors 
(Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004; Sirr et al., 2012). 
It is suggested that countries should further invest in their national branding as 
part of their image building efforts and communicate this image internally and externally. 
Furthermore, investing in research about the external perceptions of the country’s 
national picture is necessary to understand how foreign investors view them abroad, or 
else their PR campaigns will flop (Domeisen, 2003). However, other opinions state that 
determining investors’ perceptions is perplexing, especially in emerging markets, due to 
many challenges, out of which political risk stand the greatest (Sirr et al., 2012). 
Similarly, the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) points to 
the significance of the political context and risk on investors’ perception and their choice 
of investment location. It further stresses on the importance of realizing that such risks 
can adversely impact FDI attraction. therefore IPAs need to pay attention and be capable 
of effectively addressing these risks through image building activities (WAIPA, 2012). 
b. Investment Generation 
Investment Generation is another core function of IPAs. It is considered a more 
directed approach to investment promotion, since it focuses on specific sectors and 
countries to produce investment leads through making the IPA’s location appealing (Sirr 
et al, 2012). Its activities comprise engaging in direct mail or telephone campaigns to 
specific private and public firms, which are key players in the targeted sectors. Not only 
can these activities be effective and cost-efficient, but also successful strategies for firm 
targeting and building long-term relations (Loewendahl, 2001). 
Concentrating on investment missions for specific industries or sectors is also 
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vital activity for networking with a larger prospective investment community 
(Loewendahl (2001). Missions require a properly made firm research based on which, 
tailored presentations that tackle the needs of the targeted investors and ensure the host 
country’s ability to meet these needs, will be offered (Wells and Wint, 1990). That is why 
involving embassies abroad in investment generation can be effective and cost efficient.  
According to Loewendahl (2001), conducting Trade missions can be another 
effective and critical activity to be adopted, especially in developing countries, as they 
can play an imperative role in developing strategic partnerships between local and foreign 
firms, such as joint ventures, technology licensing, and outsourcing agreements. Such 
inter-firm partnerships are necessary for developing countries to transfer technology and 
foster the business of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Loewendahl, 2001; 
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004).  
Noticeably, the activities under this function fall under marketing techniques, as 
in image building, however, they are more directed. One reason is that locations differ 
from one country to another and so should their promotion objectives. Therefore, 
marketing purposes vary from placing a location on the map, to creating a distinguished 
image for a country or repositioning an existing one (Loewendahl, 2001). Another reason 
that necessitates IPAs to act as investment generators is the tight budgets and funding 
sources, which represent a continuous challenge to them (Sirr at al., 2012).  IPAs need to 
be selective and adopt the most effective activities for investment promotion, such as 
sector or firm focused approach, because it has proven more effective in generating more 
investments in contrast to general public relations campaigns linked with image building 
(Wells and Wint, 2000).  
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However, experience show that investment generation works best, when the 
actual business climate in a country is better than the perceptions presumed by investors 
(Loewendahl, 2001). Furthermore, IPAs can only shift their promotional efforts to 
investment generation when a positive image of business climate is already existent 
among potential investors (Wells and Wint, 2000).Therefore, maintaining the right 
balance between both functions, and not falling in the trap of rapidly shifting to 
investment generation, or staying in image-building phase longer than needed is crucial 
(Sirr et al., 2012; MIGA, 2016). Moreover, the timing of the decision to move to 
investment generation is also central to the IPA’s success, since it should consider several 
elements, such as the existing business climate, IPA structure, adopted investment 
strategy and its budget size (MIGA, 2016).  
c. Investment Facilitation and Servicing 
Investor Facilitation and Servicing is a major function of IPAs, since it translates 
the investor’s contentment with the business climate through the operation and aftercare 
stages (UNCTAD, 1997). As an investor facilitator, an IPA mediates between the host 
country and the FDI source country by disseminating and communicating needed 
information to prospective investors that will help them during making their investment 
decisions (Lozada and Kritz, 2007; Lim, 2008). Under this function, IPAs normally 
provide investment services to the investors during three stages; pre-investment support; 
support in getting started; and aftercare services (Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004). 
Facilitation starts by offering potential investors the needed and desired 
information, whether through direct contact or through the IPA website (Lozada and 
Kritz, 2007). Additionally, investors are mainly concerned with the time speed, 
 24 
predictability and transparency of investment procedures, including obtaining permits and 
approvals, speeding up the process of starting up a business (UNCTAD, 1997). 
Therefore, the majority of IPAs provide a “one-stop shop (OSS)” to facilitate the 
investment process and assist investors in getting started.  
OSS is mainly created to deal with administrative hurdles that investors face, 
especially in their entry stage of business, before they start operation (Morisset and 
Andrews-Johnson, 2004). Thus, they provide services that range between registration, 
giving approvals, expediting the obtainment of licenses and permits, coordinating with 
the concerned authorities to get the needed utilities (water, electricity, etc.,), in addition to 
clearances and inspections (Sader, 2000; Morisset and Andrews-Johnson, 2004).  
However, Sader (2000) argues that the idealistic idea of creating a OSS, which 
assumes that a single government entity will have the necessary power to give investors 
the licenses, permits, approvals and clearances, proved unrealistic in many cases. He 
attributes this to the enormous resistance, governments who attempt to apply an OSS 
face, from the different government agencies in authority of these administrative 
procedures. The OSS concept raises the concerns of many ministerial officials and 
employees that it will threaten their powers and restrain their mandates. This is why 
conflicts and turf battles within the governmental establishments take place (Sader, 
2000). 
Sader’s argument is consistent with the view of Loewendahl (2001), who stressed 
that a successful IPA does not only depend on its professionalism, for an effective 
facilitation process, but depends greatly on its strong linkage with the governmental 
institutions. This is especially true in developing countries, as many necessary activities, 
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required to ease the investors’ business entry are highly reliant on the synergy between 
the IPA and the different government ministries and agencies.  
Aftercare services come in a later stage, post setting up a business, where the IPA 
offers a range of activities with the aim of supporting re-investments and expansions, 
generating new investments, and lastly retaining and upgrading the ongoing projects 
(Loewendahl, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007). According to Young and Hood (1994) aftercare 
services programs have the advantage and capability of extending long-term economic 
impact to the host country. 
Aftercare services encompass monitoring and offering continuous consultations to 
existent investment businesses to facilitate any hurdles and solve any bottlenecks (Lozada 
and Kritz, 2007). In addition to the fact, that these activities are key to encourage existing 
investors to take re-investment and expansion decisions, they also lead to attracting new 
investments. Following up with investors makes them content and consequently they 
become your best ambassadors to other prospective investors and will encourage them to 
think positively of a country as an investment location (UNCTAD, 1997; Loewendahl, 
2001). Most importantly, the UNCTAD (2007) indicated that, “the cost of winning 
investments through aftercare is less than that of generating investments from new 
companies” (p. 51).That explains why Lim (2008) pointed to the growing importance of 
aftercare services to any country seeking FDI. 
Retaining and upgrading the ongoing projects is another aim of providing 
aftercare services, given its fundamental role in achieving stronger linkage with local 
businesses and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which in turn leads to higher 
economic impact (UNCTAD, 2007). When aftercare services links local companies with 
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the existing foreign businesses in the country, they simply integrate the local SMEs into 
the global economy and thus have a positive long-term spillover effect on the host-
country economy (OECD, 2011). This can be conducted through providing the adequate 
policy environment that encourages creating this business linkage to ensure transferring 
know-know and technology from the foreign firms to local SMEs through provision of 
trainings and technical support to local personnel (OECD, 2011).  
Moreover, the success and effectiveness of aftercare services is the same like the 
OSS; both are highly dependent on the collaboration between the IPA and other 
governmental agencies, where a partnership approach is crucial (UNCTAD, 2007). 
d. Policy Advocacy 
The fourth and final function of investment promotion is Policy Advocacy, which 
refers to activities that advocate for a better quality of the investment climate (Wells and 
Wint, 2000). Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004) have identified policy advocacy as 
the function most correlated with FDI inflows, and OECD (2014) considered it one of the 
main measures to evaluate the success of any IPA. Despite this fact, yet professionals and 
experts of the developed world undervalue this function when they offer their assistance 
and guidance to IPAs in developing countries, since they haven’t experienced its 
necessity in their countries (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004). 
The importance of policy advocacy stems from the pivotal and practical role its 
activities play, in formulating the investment policy, identifying the existing problems 
and bottlenecks in all laws related to investment, and lobbying and offering proposals to 
improve the business climate of the country (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004; 
OECD, 2014). Furthermore, policy advocacy contributes to enhancing the overall 
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business conditions for domestic investment, because as Morriset and Andrews Johnson 
(2004) indicate, “what is good for foreign investment, in terms of investment climate, is 
equally good for the local investor” (p. 37). 
III. Importance of Investment Legislations 
Attracting foreign capital needs an adequate favorable investment climate in host 
countries, where the State’s legal mechanism, providing incentives and guarantees to 
foreign investors, compromises its founding cornerstone (Nilov, 2011). Moreover, 
according to Casey (2013), the capacity of investment promotion activities to draw more 
FDI is highly reliant on the existing regulatory environment, which is rather rewarding 
than punishing to businesses. In brief, clear laws and regulations are the pillars of any 
investment framework for several reasons. First, in the absence of a strong legal 
framework, the organizational position of an IPA may possibly become unclear and may 
in turn lead to duplication and overlapping of mandates with other involved actors 
(OECD, 2015). Second, investment by nature is futuristic and anticipative, and that is 
why transparency, predictability and credibility of policies, laws and procedures are 
principal considerations to any investor (UNCTAD, 1997; OECD, 2015). 
An effective legislative framework encourages and provides investors with the 
needed level of confidence required to make them enter the host country and engage into 
business transactions there. In this context, Casey (2013) indicated two main pitfalls that 
must be evaded in order to generate a pro-FDI framework. First is the conception and 
actuality that laws and regulations favor domestic companies over foreign ones. Second, 
the perception and reality that court in host countries are not neutral or impartial. In other 
words, host countries should cling to a “non-discriminating” principle with regards to 
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foreign investors. Sun (2002) suggests that discrimination may take place in two forms 
“either by favoring the interests of host nationals over those of foreigners or by favoring 
the interests of foreigners of certain nations over foreigners of other nations” (p.5). That 
is to say, assurance that laws do not discriminate against or between foreign investors is a 
decisive aspect in shaping a positive investment climate that is further attractive, enabling 
and supportive to investors and private sector. 
Investment regulations must also define clear set of procedures with regard to 
business entry, operation and exit. This is considered another area, where investment law 
can serve both domestic and foreign investors and reflect a favorable investment climate 
in a host country (OECD, 2008). Procedures commonly include screening, approving, 
registering, licensing, and monitoring businesses, however they vary in the number and 
completion time, across different countries (Loewendahl, 2001; Sun, 2002; Sader, 2003). 
Empirical evidence shows that the longer and more complicated administrative 
procedures are, the higher administrative and regulatory costs incurred, which in turn is 
associated with lower FDI inflows (Djankov, 2002; Sun; 2002; Torriti and Ikpe, 2015). 
Therefore, an effective legislative framework should reduce barriers to investment by 
stipulating on fixed procedures and approval mechanisms that simply shorten the 
timeframe and procedural steps applied. 
Moreover, Sun (2002) has pointed to fact that, although regulatory procedures are 
essential and useful for creating an appealing investment climate, yet how these 
procedures are being carried out makes all the difference. Therefore, the competency of 
supporting institutions is considered fundamental in any effective regulatory framework 
for attracting FDI. Accordingly, Sun indicated that for an IPA to be effective, it should 
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have a solid legal base that clearly outlines its mandate, authority, and powers. 
Furthermore, it “should define its functions and responsibilities, external structure 
including linkages with the government and the private sector, the composition and 
selection process of its board, staffing and reporting arrangements, and how it is to be 
funded” (p.15). 
IV. Effectiveness of Investment Promotion Agencies 
 
The effectiveness of IPAs to attract more FDI has been investigated in many 
researches. The most important studies and their findings are featured in this literature 
review because of their rigorousness and ability to respond to different hypothesis.  
Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) examined the IPA effectiveness in 58 
countries, in terms of the association between their promotional spending and FDI 
inflows. The cross-country variations in FDI flows found were owed to IPAs, only when 
the promotion effort is measured by the IPA budget. When the research was extended 
beyond only the amount of resources spent by the agency, to explore how the allocation 
of these resources across the IPA functions may be significant, policy advocacy appeared 
to be the most associated with cross-country variation in FDI inflows, followed by image 
building, investor services, and lastly investment generation (Morisset and Andrews-
Johnson, 2004). 
In a second study that depended on data collected through a worldwide census of 
Investment Promotion Agencies, Harding and Javorcik (2011) used information on 
investment promotion efforts from 124 countries, out of which 75% were developing 
countries. Harding and Javorcik discussed two arguments: The first is that investment 
promotion may be a cost-effective way to raise FDI influxes, mainly in developing 
 30 
countries, where information about business conditions is not available and bureaucratic 
procedures are acute. The second argument relates to IPAs engaged in sector targeting 
and whether they receive more investment in the post- targeting period, relative to the 
pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors.  
Regression modeling was used to test both hypotheses and proved that investment 
promotion efforts are more successful in developing rather than developed countries, 
where red tape and information irregularities are likely to be grave. Moreover, IPAs in 
countries suffering from high corruption, scarcity of information, and bureaucratic long 
procedures to start a business are more effective, since they reduce macroeconomic 
uncertainty by providing information, and assisting investors with complicated 
administrative procedures (Harding and Javorcik, 2011). The study regressions further 
showed that IPAs are likely to be of higher importance and significance in assisting with 
red tape more than in information provision. Likewise, for the second hypothesis, the 
empirical results indicated that IPAs engaged in targeting specific sectors, attract and 
receive more than twice as much FDI as non-targeted sectors in developing countries. 
Similarly, Charlton and Davis (2007) tested the effectiveness of investment 
promotion by examining the successfulness of IPAs in attracting more FDI at the industry 
level. The study used industry level data from 22 OECD countries on FDI inflows in 19 
different industries. Results showed that the industry targeting implemented by IPAs led 
to a 41 percent increase of FDI inflows into that industry. 
These studies used different strategies to deal with the potential reverse causality 
problem and distinguish the effect of an IPA from other changes in policies or anything 
else relevant for FDI inflows occurring at the same time. However, as clearly evident 
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from the review of literature and the summary of studies featured in Table (2), most 
studies applied quantitative methods in assessing the performance of IPAs. Yet the 
dynamics of private investment, including the implementation feasibility that changes by 
the differences in circumstances, institutional capacities and contextual factors across 
countries, remain under captured. This presents a gap in the literature that this research 
will tackle by using a qualitative design that will facilitate explaining the contextual 
factors influencing the potential of IPAs to effectively attract and promote investments. 
Table (2) Summary of Major Studies on IPAs Effectiveness 
Study and 
Author 
Methodologies and Samples 
Used 
Findings 
Wells and Wint 
(1990) 
Regression analysis  
50 country cases 
 Positive relationship between IPAs 
and FDI influxes. 
Loewendahl 
(2001) 
 
No empirical test was used 
 Aftercare activities should be given 
more attention among the investment 
promotion activities, in order to 
maximize the long-term benefits 
from inflowing FDI. 
Morisset and 
Andrews- 
Johnson (2004) 
Regression analysis that used IPA 
budget, IPA staff, and control 
variables. 
58 country cases 
 Positive relationship between IPA’s 
promotional budget and FDI influxes. 
 
 Policy advocacy is the most 
associated with FDI inflows, 
followed by image building, investor 
services, and lastly investment 
generation. 
Charlton and 
Davis (2007) 
Statistical techniques (propensity 
score matching and the difference-
in-differences specification) 
 
Cases of 19 industries from 22 
OECD countries 
 
 Investment generation and sector 
targeting attract more FDI than 
general promotion. 
 
 Sector targeting led to a 41% 
increase in the growth rate of FDI 
inflows in the specified sectors. 
Harding and 
Javorcik (2011) 
Regression analysis that used 
proxies to capture the availability 
of information about the host 
country and the heavy bureaucratic 
 Investment promotion efforts are 
more successful in countries with red 
tape and information irregularities. 
 
 IPAs are of higher significance in 
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procedures they have. 
124 country cases 
assisting with red tape more than in 
information provision. 
 
 IPAs engaged in targeting specific 
sectors, attract and receive more than 
twice as much FDI as non-targeted 
sectors in developing countries. 
Source: Author Constructed 
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Chapter Three: 
Literature Review on Investment in Egypt and Evolution of GAFI 
 
This chapter offers an overview on the general investment environment in Egypt, 
by presenting a quantitative picture of the FDI figures and the country’s rank in 
international reports with respect to many priority issues for investors, along with 
reviewing the developments and reforms that have been carried out by the government to 
improve the overall business climate. In the second part, the researcher will go over 
different investment legislative frameworks in order to review the history of GAFI from 
its inception and discuss the development of its role and powers until our present day. It 
will conclude by tackling GAFI’s current mandate. This overview lays a proper ground 
for understanding the new investment law in force, and therefore analyzing how the 
current institutional and legislative frameworks impact the way GAFI operates.  
I. Overview on the Investment Environment in Egypt 
Given the importance of investments to the country’s economic growth, Egypt has 
been among those developing countries competing to attract FDI by adopting different 
strategies to attract foreign investors, such as liberalizing trade, granting incentives, 
facilitating business entry, and establishing free and special economic zones. In this 
regard, the Egyptian investment environment has witnessed several legislative and 
institutional reforms that considerably impacted the level of FDI inflows and similarly the 
level of domestic investments. 
A significant increase in FDI inflows can be witnessed by taking a look at their 
levels during the past two decades, especially during the period between 2006 and 2008 
(Figure 2), which in turn contributed to the revival of the Egyptian economy. The FDI 
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inflow has risen from US$2 billion in 2004 to US$13.2 billion in 2008 (MoI, 2015). This 
upturn can be attributed to the government’s efforts during this period to simplify and 
streamline investment procedures, eliminate bureaucratic hurdles, in addition, privatize 
several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-sector banks that took place between 
1991 and 2008, under the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program 
(ERSAP) (Masry, 2015). 
Figure (2) Net Foreign Direct Investment in Egypt 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt  
However, it can be noted from Figure (2) that FDI inflows started to decline in 
2009, reaching its lowest point in 2011 due to the 25th of January Revolution and its 
ramifications. The political instability that followed was accompanied by an elevation in 
policy uncertainty, labor strikes in public and private sectors, a rise in the unemployment 
rate, reluctance from the government officials to make strong decisions, in addition to an 
occurrence of a serious energy crisis. Furthermore, investor disputes increased after court 
decisions to nullify seven sale and privatization contract agreements of state entities to 
foreign investors. All of these predicaments have negatively and enormously affected the 
country’s overall business climate, harmed many economic sectors and pushed investors 
away from operating in Egypt.  
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As a result, there was an urgent need to revive private investments and hence the 
Egyptian government began to revise all investment policies and practices, consider 
institutions’ effectiveness, and reform laws to regain the investors’ confidence. With the 
advent of a new President, great attention was directed towards investment, to support the 
country and overcome its exacerbated economic situation. The government held the 
Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) in March 2015 with political support 
from different countries, especially the Gulf ones, and international institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group. These efforts mark 
Egypt’s eagerness on improving the investment climate and restoring economic growth.  
In a competitive international environment, attracting more FDI is challenging 
and requires the presence of competent national institutions with an integrated structure 
that fits the contemporary world affairs. Furthermore, it requires a realistic realization of 
where the country stands, with respect to issues of high priority to investment attraction. 
In 2016, Egypt’s rank in the World Bank Doing Business Reports (Tables 3 and 4), 
dropped to 131 out of 188 countries in 2016 compared to 94 out of 183 countries in 2011, 
with regards to the ease of doing business. Moreover, Egypt’s rank in 2015 continued to 
deteriorate in the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World Economic Forum, since 
2011 Revolution, where a significant decline was observed in the “Macroeconomic 
Environment” and “Institutions” pillars (WEF, 2015). 
  Table (3): Egypt's Ranks in Doing Business Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Doing Business Report Series, 2011-2016 
 
 
Ease of Doing Business 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
94 of 183 110 of 183 109 of 185 128 of 189 126 of 189 131 of 189 
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Table (4): Ease of Doing Business ranks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Doing Business Report Series 
Several concerns remain unappealing to investors and problematic for a healthy 
investment climate. On top of these concerns come the policy instability and the 
inefficient government bureaucracy as the two most problematic factors for doing 
business in Egypt, according to the Doing Business report of 2016. Also, with respect to 
the protection of “Property Rights”, whether real or intellectual, Egypt’s score in the 
International Property Rights Index has dropped for the fourth consecutive year (Figure 
3), marking 4.1 for 2015 in comparison to 4.6 in 2014 (IPRI, 2015). According to the 
World Bank Doing Business report (2016), an investor in Egypt is required to deal with 8 
procedures that demand 63 days to register a real property at a cost of 0.6% of the 
property’s value. The overall country rank of 111 out of 189, with respect to ease of 
registering property, shows how Egypt lags behind countries’ averages as for the number 
of procedures and days required to register a property. Likewise, the status of 
“Intellectual Property Rights” (IPR) is weak despite the fact that Egypt has a law1 for 
protecting the intellectual property rights, and the stipulation of the new 2014 
                                                        
1Law No. 82 for 2002 
Indicators 2016 2015 2011 
Change in ranks 
from 2015 and 2016 
Starting a Business 73 69 18 -4 
Dealing with Construction Permits 113 114 154 +1 
Getting Electricity 144 145 - +1 
Registering Property 111 109 93 -2 
Getting Credit 79 71 72 -8 
Protecting Minority Investors 122 133 74 +11 
Paying Taxes 151 146 136 -5 
Trading Across Borders 157 157 21 No change 
Enforcing Contracts  155 155 143 No change 
Resolving Insolvency 119 121 131 +2 
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Constitution on the state’s commitment to the protection of IPR in Article 692. However, 
IPRI (2015) reports that Egypt’s position is 83 out of 129 globally, and 10 out of 20 
regionally with respect to intellectual property (Table 5).  
Figure (3): IPRI Overall Index 
 
Source: IPRI, 2015 
 
 
Table (5): IPRI Scores for Egypt in 2015 
  Score Globally Regionally 
Overall 4.1 102 of 129 14 of 20 
Legal and Political 3.6 94 of 129 16 of 20 
Physical 4.5 115 of 129 20 of 20 
Intellectual 4.3 83 of 129 10 of 20 
Source: IPRI, 2015 
 
Corruption is another important area that needs to be tackled in Egypt. Several 
studies have proved its negative association with a country’s capital inflows, and hence a 
liability to the host economy (Della Porta and Vanucci, 1999; Zurawicki and Habib, 
2010). Ketkar et al. (2005) have found that a one-point increase in CPI would attract an 
average additional FDI of 0.5% of GDP in developing countries. In addition, a “three 
point improvement in CPI would more than double the corporate tax take on average” 
(p.1) in Egypt. Furthermore, Handoussa and Louis (2003) indicated that corruption in 
Egypt is related to institutional framework, specifically with regulating the entry of 
                                                        
2Article 69: The state shall protect all types of intellectual property in all fields, and shall establish a 
specialized body to uphold the rights of Egyptians and their legal protection, as regulated by law. 
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foreign investors. Moreover, corruption has become a worrisome concern for prospective 
investors following the 2011 Revolution, after the cases that have been brought against 
private companies, nullifying the privatization deals of seven SOEs, owing to corruption 
and faulty contracts. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
which classify countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be, 
ranked Egypt 88 out of 168 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015). 
Other matters like competition from SOEs, investment dispute settlement, and the 
existence of a bankruptcy law greatly contribute to shaping a supportive environment for 
nurturing investments, where competent institutions can play a significant role. This takes 
us to the next part unfolding GAFI and its development over time. 
II. Investment Frameworks in Egypt and Evolution of GAFI throughout 
Legislations 
 
In order to understand the current context within which GAFI operates, its role, 
scope of work, and limit of powers, it is imperative to give a brief background on its 
inception and how its role developed over years. Therefore, this section provides a brief 
summary on GAFI and how it was initiated and developed overtime. It sheds light on 
important stops that are remarked in the age of the agency, tackles its current mandates, 
and emphasizes the focal policies and laws enacted in Egypt.  
a. GAFI’s Inception 
  The first investment law in Egypt was promulgated by President Mohamed 
Anwar el Sadat in 1971. Since that date, Egypt has been witnessing a succession of 
investment laws over the past 45 years. Law 65/1971 aimed at attracting foreign 
investments through offering many incentives that included the establishment of free 
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zones and guarantees against nationalization actions by the government. Nevertheless, it 
attracted very few investments due to the sensitivity of the period and the ramifications of 
the 1967 War that followed (Farah, 2009). Three years later, in 1974, President Sadat 
introduced the Open Door Policy, allowing foreign investments in the country after long 
decades of prohibition. Like law 65/1971, Law 43/1974 for Arab and Foreign Funds and 
the Free Zones, aimed at opening the door to Arab and foreign capitals through offering 
privileges and legal protection. To facilitate the process of foreign investment, the Law 
stipulated the establishment of the General Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment 
and Free Zones, to work under the auspices of the Prime Minister and be the responsible 
body for administering the law. Responsibilities charged to the Authority included 
identifying appropriate projects for investment, contacting investors and assessing their 
proposed projects, facilitating the process of investment, operation, and obtaining the 
necessary permits and administrative approvals, studying Egypt's investment laws and 
regulations and offering the appropriate recommendations for improving the foreign 
investment code, approving the profit repatriation process, in addition to managing the 
free Zones. 
The law identified nine specific areas for foreign and Arab investments and relied 
on offering incentives and guarantees, some of which the Authority was granted the right 
to offer. These incentives and guarantees included an assurance to refrain from 
nationalization and confiscation of investment projects or its capital; tax exemption from 
5 to 8 years and from 10 to 15 years for projects of reconstruction and establishment of 
new cities; deferment on paying customs duties; duty-free imports of equipment, 
machinery, and material considered "necessary" for projects establishment and operation. 
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Law 43/1974 was amended several times, until replaced by Law 230/1989, which was in 
turn replaced by another law in 1997. 
b. Reinventing GAFI: from a regulator to a facilitator 
  In 1997, under the ruling of President Mubarak, the Guarantees and Investment 
Incentives Law No. 8/1997 was issued and stayed in force until 2015. The law aimed at 
encouraging domestic and foreign investments in targeted economic sectors and 
promoting incentives for industry to relocate it away from the crowded Nile Valley area 
(Stone, 2009). The law identified specific areas for investment and regulated companies, 
which work in these areas irrespective to their legal form. Specified investment areas 
included agricultural, poultry and animal production, industry and mining, oil services 
relating to digging and exploration, hotels and tourism, sea transport, housing and 
infrastructure, computer software and high-tech products, medical facilities, some 
financial services firms, projects funded by the Social Development Fund. 
  The law also abolished the old GAFI and stipulated on replacing it by a new 
entity, to be the sole authority responsible to guide the investors, whether domestic or 
foreign, and which is designated to establish their companies. Similar to Law 43/1997, 
this law relied again on offering guarantees and incentives to attract investments. It 
grouped around 20 incentives and exemptions under one law; precisely tax exemptions in 
the mentioned specific fields, however the legislator took the spatial scale – the location 
where investment activities will be carried – as the basis for determining the exemption 
duration to lie between five and twenty-year tax exemptions accordingly. Incentives and 
guarantees entailed allowing a full foreign ownership of ventures; providing the right to 
own land and to maintain foreign currency bank accounts; guaranteeing the right to 
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repatriate capital and profits; and stipulating on equal treatment regardless of nationality.  
  It is important to refer to other important decrees and laws that impacted GAFI’s 
powers and authority. On one hand, in 2002, two decrees were issued; Presidential 
Decree No. 79/2002 to establish OSS under GAFI; and Prime Minister’s Decree No. 
636/2002 to organize the work of the OSS. The main aim was to override bureaucracy 
and facilitate procedures for investors, through providing all the necessary investment 
related services at one place, and bringing together officials from the relevant 
government entities to offer approvals, permits and licenses without obliging investors to 
refer to other higher authorities.  
On the other hand, Law 13/2004, amending Law 8/1997 was issued to consolidate 
GAFI and the Companies’ Authority into one single entity responsible for establishing all 
new companies. This new law also unified many legal procedures necessary for 
registration. It further empowered GAFI to give temporary licenses for project 
establishment, and to act on behalf of investors and government bodies throughout the 
life cycle of a project. All of these legislations along with other important factors at that 
time, as the strong political support, enabled GAFI to shift its role from a regulator to a 
promoter and from a prevalent culture of bureaucracy accustomed to regulating the 
private sector to another more accustomed to assisting it.  
  Another important stop to note is the issuance of the Unified Corporate and 
Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005 by the Egyptian Cabinet. This law ended the tax 
exemptions that were previously stipulated on, in the Investment Law, and instead 
compensated them by decreasing the rate of Corporate Tax from 42% to only 20%. 
Hence, investors were left to establish their businesses under either law; the Investment 
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or the Companies Law, since both had the same incentives and guarantees. In either case, 
GAFI maintained the status of the official governmental regulator, responsible for 
reviewing and approving projects. This decision was pursuant to the conviction that tax 
exemptions do not represent a real incentive to serious investors. Also, it was viewed in 
favor of the Egyptian economy because it aims at rectifying the perceived injustices of 
the Investment Law and controlling the rampant administrative corruption and tax fraud. 
Table (6) summarizes the most important investment laws and amendments with respect 
to their effect over GAFI and its powers. 
Table (6) Laws and GAFI powers 
Law Number Features and Powers Granted to GAFI 
Arab and Foreign 
Capital Investment Law 
43/1974 
 Opened the door to Arab and foreign capitals through offering privileges and legal 
protection 
 
 Established the General Authority for Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones. 
 
 GAFI is responsible for screening and approving foreign investment projects 
 
 GAFI suggests and approves incentives upon a presidential decree 
 
 GAFI shall issue the required permits and licenses 
 
 GAFI’s role was a regulator. 
Investment 
Incentives Law 
8/1997 and its 
amendments and 
related decrees. 
 
 Presidential Decree 
284/1997 to establish 
GAFI 
 
 Presidential Decree 
79/2002 to establish OSS 
 
 Prime Minister’s decree 
636/2002 organized the 
work of the OSS 
 
 Stipulated on equal treatment regardless of nationality 
 
 Replaced old GAFI with a new one by a presidential decree.  
 
 Changed GAFI’s governance to encompass three vice-chairmen, a Board of 
Directors, and a Board of Trustees.  
 
 GAFI may establish offices inside or outside Egypt 
 
 Established One-Stop-Shop under GAFI. 
 
 GAFI is the sole body responsible for investors’ incentives and guarantees (tax 
advantages, reduced tariffs for imported inputs, and guarantees against 
confiscation). 
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 Law 13/2004 (added 
articles 47-70) 
 
 Presidential Decree 
316/2004 
 GAFI is mandated to assist investors in site selection and land acquisition for their 
projects 
 
 GAFI serves as a One-Stop-Shop to facilitate and simplify procedures of obtaining 
licenses, approvals and registration of new companies, however it was only 
functional in the phase of establishing firms (started in Jan 2005). 
 
 Empowered GAFI to give temporary licenses for project establishment, and to act 
on behalf of investors and government bodies throughout the life cycle of a project. 
 
 Formed a dispute settlement committee in GAFI to manage any problems between 
investors and any administrative bodies 
 
 Shifted GAFI’s role towards an investment facilitator and promoter. 
Income Tax Law 
91/2005 
 
 Abolished the tax holidays, previously provided by Law 8/1997. 
 
 Lowered the income tax rate by 50 per cent by introducing a flat corporate tax of 
20% (instead of 42%) to compensate for the abolition of the tax holidays. 
Source: Author Constructed 
 
c. Current Mandates of GAFI 
 
The current mandates of GAFI according to its original founding decree and the recent 
Investment Law No. 17/2015
3
, include the responsibility of (1) attracting, developing, 
and promoting investments at the foreign and domestic levels
4
, (2) providing all the 
required investment services through acting as a one-stop shop, to assist investors and 
grant them necessary approvals, permits, and licenses to start up and operate a business in 
Egypt. It is also entrusted with the task of unifying the entire set of official application 
forms and templates in coordination with the competent authorities, and providing those 
forms and templates for electronic use. In addition, it is in charge of (3) regulating and 
managing the investment zones and the free zones, whether public
5
 or private, where it is 
                                                        
3 Articles 85 and 86 in Law No. 17/2015 
4 This mandate shall be carried out by a newly established ‘National Center’- Details in Chapter 6 
5 There are currently 10 public free zones in operation in the following locations: Alexandria, Damietta, 
East Port Said Port Zone, Ismalia, Qeft, Media Production City, Nasr City, Port Said, Shebin El Kom, and 
Suez. 
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authorized to grant firms that are not physically located in free zones the status of 
“private free zones” to enjoy its special benefits. GAFI also holds the responsibility of (4) 
stimulating entrepreneurship and SME investments by providing financial and know-how 
support through its “Bedaya Center for Entrepreneurship and SME Development”, which 
was established in 2010.Moreover, GAFI provides other services like (5) settling disputes 
through the “Investors' Dispute Settlement Center” established in 2009, to settle through 
mediation any disputes that may arise between investors and among shareholders of 
foreign invested companies. This service is also provided online, where investors can 
have access to decisions made by the Dispute Settlement Committee and the date of the 
decision. However, it is only available in Arabic. 
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Chapter Four:  
Conceptual Framework  
This chapter presents the conceptual framework adopted in this thesis. It frames 
and perceives the different concepts that directly affect the process of investment 
promotion. It should be noted that this research focuses only on the promotion mandate 
of the IPA, excluding any other additional ones. The concepts identified in this 
conceptual framework are derived from the literature review to help the researcher 
precisely answer the research questions.  
The conceptual framework has three facets. The first focuses on conceptualizing 
the “investment promotion agency”, being an executive arm for the government to 
enhance the situation of private investment. The second facet concentrates on the 
elements that define the effectiveness of an IPA. The third facet delineates the legislative 
framework, which directly affects the process of investment promotion and the IPA. 
I. Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) 
Investment promotion is a process of attracting foreign and domestic investments 
with the aim of contributing to the economic growth and development of a country. 
Hence, investment promotion agency is intrinsic for facilitating this process.  
As identified in the literature, by the most studies and best practices, this research 
perceives investment promotion agency as the institutionalization of a country’s 
dedication and determination to attract FDI, through performing the four main 
promotional activities; precisely ‘image building’; ‘investment generation’; ‘investor 
facilitation and servicing’; and ‘policy advocacy’. Moreover, the study further views the 
IPA as the government’s executive arm, in charge of interpreting the goals and objectives 
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of the country’s national investment strategy into actual results, and therefore analyzes 
the extent to which an interventionist approach is contributing to attracting private 
investment in Egypt. 
II. Effectiveness of Institutional Structure of IPAs 
The research conceives the institutional structure as a manifestation of the 
potential of the IPA, which further determines its internal and external strengths. The 
effectiveness of this institutional structure relies on elements related to both 
organizational characteristics and its performed functions. Hence, each of these elements 
is detailed and defined as follows:  
a. Organizational Elements  
1. Legal status  
The legal status element of the IPA portrays its basic legal features that can be 
depicted in the mode of creation; whether the IPA is created by a decree or a law and its 
institutional form; whether the IPA is purely governmental or quasi-governmental or 
private. Both represent the legal foundation for an IPA, which directly influence its 
mandate and powers, and in turn affect its capacity to attract FDI. The legal status also is 
concerned with the nature of mandates given to the IPA. 
2. IPA’s Relationship with the Government 
This element tackles the existing relationship between the IPA and its respective 
ministry, in addition to its relationship with other governmental ministries and agencies. 
First, it highlights the IPA positioning within the political system, which can be 
inferred from the degree of autonomy in which the IPA enjoys, as well as its reporting 
mechanism.  
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Second, it encompasses the political context within which the IPA operates and 
may influence its capacity for effective performance, which mainly depends on the IPA 
positioning within the political system.  It focuses on the intra-governmental relations and 
coordination mechanisms that are usually shaped by the power dynamics between the 
IPA and these different ministries, and agencies.  
3. IPA’s Relationship with private sector 
This element involves the linkage and level of cooperation between the IPA and 
the private sector. It focuses on the representation of private sector in the governance of 
the IPA, their involvement in the functioning of the IPA and the IPA’s linkage to other 
business communities.  
4. IPA’s Resources 
This element involves both the financial and human resources pertaining to the 
promotional mandate. Hence, the research only focuses on those resources in the 
promotion division in the IPA.  
Human resources focus on the number of staff dedicated to promotion in the IPA 
and their qualification level. The financial resources concentrate on size of budget 
allocated to promotion. 
b. Functional Elements  
1. Image building 
This element is meant to portray a country as a favorable and credible place for 
foreign investments. It focuses on the strategy and tools used to build an image of a 
country within the investment community as an appealing location for attracting future 
investments. 
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2. Investment generation  
Investment generation element looks at the extent to which the IPA successfully 
prioritizes specific sectors or industries, with a view of creating investment leads. It 
focuses on the presence of a targeting strategy and its linkage with the country’s overall 
economic vision.   
3. Investors servicing and facilitation 
This element refers to the range of services provided by the IPA that can assist an 
investor in analyzing investment decisions, establishing a business, and maintaining it in 
good standing.  
4. Policy advocacy 
This element looks at an IPA as an investment promotion tool by being part of the 
broader policy process regarding investment. It identifies the agency’s activities aimed at 
improving the quality of the investment climate through lobbying for reforming 
investment policies and laws. 
III. Legislative Framework  
Creating an appropriate legal framework for investment is one of the fundamental 
elements for improving the investment environment. On one side, it enhances the stability 
of transactions, and on the other side, it raises the degree of confidence in the strength of 
the economic system as a whole. This legal framework should offer investors with 
sufficient protection measures and guarantee the facilitation of procedures, which would 
therefore encourage accumulating capital, lower transaction costs and contribute to 
giving investors a sense of real stability; all of which are needed for long-term 
investments. 
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This research perceives the legal framework as the laws and regulations that 
govern the IPA and enable its operations with regards to performing its promotional and 
facilitation role. The legislative framework sets the legal guarantees provided to investors 
and the different incentives used for attracting FDI. It further determines if the IPA has 
the required adequate control to assist investors in establishing and maintaining their 
businesses. 
The relationship between the concepts provided in the conceptual framework is 
presented in the conceptual map in figure (4). 
It can be noticed that the four organizational elements affect each other. Also they 
strongly affect the functional elements. For instance, on one hand, the mode of creation in 
the legal status determines the political positioning of the IPA in the government, since it 
either protects it from or exposes it to disruptive amendments that occur usually with 
government reshuffles. Therefore, it contributes to the IPA stability, which is key in 
maintaining its political relations with other governmental agencies and positioning itself 
as a mediator between them and the different investment opportunities. On the other 
hand, if the institutional form is purely governmental, this would affect the quality and 
culture of performing the promotional and facilitation roles.  
Furthermore, the relationship with the government directly affects the quality of 
services provided to the investors, especially when it comes to land allocation and 
licenses. Also, the fact that the IPA is well positioned in the government and maintains 
high quality political relations with other ministries and agencies empowers the IPA to 
play a more effective advocacy role.  
The relationship with the private sector sturdily affects the investors’ perceptions 
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about the IPA, since it enables the IPA to identify and understand the obstacles of 
investment from the investors’ perspective, which would in turn empower the IPA to play 
a tougher role in policy advocacy supported by the private sector. It also contributes in 
fostering a business like culture, away from rigid bureaucratic nature of governmental 
institutions. 
Moreover, the human and financial resources are greatly affected by the degree of 
IPA linkage to the private sector. For example, the private sector could offer funds to IPA 
budget, and hence contribute to maintaining adequate financial resources, which will in 
turn allow for attracting qualified skilled caliber to the IPA. This will positively affect 
carrying out the promotional functions.  
Also, the functional elements affect each other. For example, focusing on 
investors servicing and policy advocacy functions directly influence the image building. 
In addition, prioritizing efforts towards the country’s “image building” lead to investment 
generation. 
Hence, both organizational and functional elements determine the extent to which 
the institutional structure of the IPA is effective. Furthermore, the legislative framework 
in which the IPA operates directly influences the IPA and the effectiveness of its 
institutional structure.  
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Figure (4): Conceptual Map 
Source: Author Constructed 
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Chapter Five: 
Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology used in this research. The first section 
details the approach used, followed by a second section that outlines the data sources, 
sample design and data analysis techniques. 
I. Methodology 
In order to understand the extent to which GAFI is enabled to fulfill its mandate 
as the national agency in Egypt responsible for investment promotion, a qualitative 
methodological approach of a single case study analysis is applied. The selection of the 
case study is based on the fact that GAFI is the only IPA in Egypt, and is considered the 
executive arm of the Ministry of Investment (MoI), responsible for executing the MoI 
strategy in promoting and facilitating investments.  
As for the limitations of the study, although the research increases the scope of 
knowledge about IPAs in general and provides a more clear understanding of the 
dynamics of investment promotion in Egypt in particular, its findings are only country 
limited and cannot be generalized to other IPAs worldwide, due to the methodological 
limitation inherent in the case study approach. The resistance of interviewees to disclose 
information about the budget allocated for promotion and their financial operations with 
regards to its different activities was another study limitation. 
 
II. Data Collection 
The research depends on both desk research and primary data. The desk research 
is gathered through a dynamic and critical reading of the existing investment laws, in 
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addition to reviewing other relevant laws, executive regulations, decrees, governmental 
documents, books, and literature in the form of national and international reports and 
studies. Whereas, collecting primary data was through conducting a number of in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with a purposeful sample. 
III. Sample Design 
This research uses a purposive sample of nineteen interviewees. Interviews were 
conducted during 2016 between the period of 30 May and 3 August 2016. Each interview 
took between one to three hours, and the identity of the interviewees remains anonymous. 
The sample included current and former officials in GAFI, Ministry of Investment, 
Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform (MoPMAR), in addition to 
affiliates to the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The following part encompasses the 
rationale behind selecting each of these units for analysis. 
a. The General Authority For Investment and Free Zones 
GAFI is the main unit of analysis and the case study of this research. The sample 
includes interviews one of GAFI’s current Senior Management, which comprises of a 
CEO and 2 deputies, former chairmen, board members from private sectors, and senior 
officials from different functional departments inside GAFI. Interviews were conducted 
to provide the researcher with a clear understanding to the agency’s main functions, 
especially those related to image building, investment generation, policy advocacy and 
services provided to investors at different stages. It further helped explore the intra-
governmental relationship between GAFI and other concerned ministries and authorities, 
in addition to the degree of influence the private sector has on the decisions taken inside 
the agency. Moreover, it allowed the researcher to investigate the effect of the new 
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investment law on GAFI’s functions and operation. Therefore, 14 interviews were 
conducted with: 
 GAFI’s Management Official 
 Two Board Members 
 Two Senior Promotion Officials  
 Senior OSS Official 
 Senior Policies Official 
 Senior Dispute Settlement Official 
 Five Functional Officers 
 Researcher in the Management Office 
b. Ministry of Investment 
Interviews were aimed at examining the relationship between GAFI and MoI, 
how this relationship affects the private investment, the perception of MoI towards GAFI 
in light of the new law, and how MoI supports GAFI. Hence, two interviews were 
conducted with: 
 Senior Official at the Ministry of Investment 
 Current Assistant to Minister of Investment 
c. Other Ministries and Agencies 
Interviews were conducted with government officials from the MoPMAR, and 
affiliates of the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade, namely the Industrial 
Development Agency (IDA), and the Industry Modernization Center (IMC), to cross 
check whether the new law gives the right mandates to GAFI, and to further examine the 
relationship and level of cooperation between GAFI and these ministries and shed light 
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on how these relationships affect private investment in Egypt. Three interviews were 
conducted with 
 Senior Official at MoPMAR 
MoPMAR coordinated with GAFI in promoting for investment opportunities 
during the EEDC and is the responsible ministry for preparing the investment chapter in 
the State budget. In addition, the selected official also served as Former Principle Deputy 
Minister at MoI, therefore he was included in the sample to explore the dynamics of 
issuing Law17/2015 at MoI. His two titles will be used simultaneously in the research. 
 Former Chairman of IDA.  
IDA is considered one of the powerful agencies and main players in facilitating 
investments, since it is considered an authority with jurisdiction over lands and also 
grants industrial licenses. Therefore it is a decisive agency with regards to obtaining 
licenses from the OSS. 
 Senior Official at IMC.  
IMC is supposed to work with GAFI on promoting some industries and offering 
services to the investors. 
IV. Data Analysis 
The primary data collected through the semi-structured interviews was 
thematically analyzed based on specific elements that are provided in the conceptual 
framework. Other secondary data obtained from investment laws and executive 
regulations were critically analyzed. Data triangulation is used in this research by 
obtaining the data from interviews with former and current different hierarchal levels 
inside GAFI and other governmental ministries and agencies. Using data triangulation 
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allowed for cross- checking and validating the findings of this research. Based on 
thematic analysis, the data emerged from both primary data and desk research was 
synthesized together to provide clear and deep understanding of the different 
characteristics that shape the structure of GAFI and impact its effectiveness. 
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Chapter Six: 
Legislative Framework and Institutional Analysis of GAFI 
 
This chapter presents the discussion and analysis of the field of investigation 
according to the methodology stated earlier in Chapter Five. It is divided into two 
sections; the first tackles Law No. 17/2015, the current legislative framework that 
governs the structure and functions of GAFI. It specifically lays emphasis on the new 
amendments added, with the aim of empowering GAFI and giving it tools to attract 
investors and promote investments. Whereas, the second section encompasses an 
institutional analysis for GAFI, with discussion over its organizational and functional 
elements, which according to the existing literature on investment promotion, constitute 
the structural potential of any IPA that can in turn devise its efficiency in acting as a 
country’s national IPA. 
Both sections answer the main research question; “To what extent do the 
structure and legislative framework of GAFI enable it to perform its role as the national 
Investment Promotion Agency of Egypt?” They further help in identifying the gap 
between the actual and desired performance of GAFI, enabling the researcher to come up 
with recommendations for policy-makers in order to close the implementation gaps 
between laws and practice and enable them to formulate policies and adopt better 
mechanisms that contribute positively to the investment environment in Egypt. 
I. Law No. 17/2015- Current Law In Force  
The circumstances within which the new legal framework came to light are worth 
highlighting. Investment Law No. 17/2015 came out together with the Civil Service Law 
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No. 18/2015, in March of year 2015, just one day before holding the Egypt Economic 
Development Conference (EEDC) in Sharm el Sheikh. The  
main target was sending a message to investors that 
Egypt’s government is committed to administrative 
and economic reforms by curbing bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and solving the investment hurdles. 
Therefore, Law No. 17/2015 introduced additional  
guarantees (Figure 5), and a bundle of substantial 
amendments to the preceding Investment Law No. 
8/1997, seeking to attract more foreign investments. 
However, these amendments instead, sparked 
controversy among lawmakers and economic circles, 
pertaining to its philosophy and adopted means for 
promoting and attracting investments. 
This section addresses the philosophy of introducing Law No. 17/2015, through 
focusing on the main themes that summarize its newly provided additional guarantees 
and incentives. In addition, it also discusses some of the tools assigned to GAFI in light 
of these new amendments, whereas examining their feasibility will follow in the second 
section. The main themes are depicted in the following;  
a. Giving More Tax and Non-Tax Incentives  
The first key aspect in Law No. 17/2015 is based on offering more incentives, 
both tax and non-tax, to investors.  Tax and custom incentives were limited to a 50% 
 
 Ensuring equality between local and foreign 
investors in the right of owning land. 
 
 Transferring of net profit, capital and 
wageworkers abroad. 
 
 Solving investment disputes through means 
previously agreed upon with the investor or by 
arbitration.  
 
 Introducing new mechanism for disputes 
settlement between the government and 
investors through a ministerial committee. 
 
 Stipulating the necessity to prove criminal 
intent to accuse the legal representative of the 
company in crime according to investments 
acts. 
Source: Author Constructed 
Figure (5): Guarantees Offered by 
Law No 17/2015 
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reduction in sales tax
6
on machinery and equipment necessary for production that would 
later be repaid when submitting the first tax return, in addition to dropping the customs 
duties on equipment used for production from 5% to 2%
7
. Nevertheless, more non-tax 
incentives
8
, such as low energy prices, subsidizing technical training programs for 
employees, allocating lands at reduced prices, and reimbursing investors with costs paid 
to get necessary utilities would be provided by GAFI, upon permission from the Cabinet 
of Ministers, in a period that does not exceed 30 days from the investor’s application 
request. These incentives are limited to projects that are either labor-intensive, or raise 
the proportion of local content in the final product, or work in certain fields
9
, or projects 
that are located in remote and deprived regions
10
. The law further grants GAFI punitive 
authority that permits it to penalize the companies that violate the provisions of the law 
by suspending, reducing, or terminating the exemptions and incentives they are 
enjoying
11
. 
There are two main problems to illustrate with these articles; the first is legal, it 
lies in violating a firm constitutional principle that taxes and exemptions should be 
applied by law, and not by administrative decrees, even if it comes from the Cabinet. 
Therefore, the authority given to the Cabinet and in turn to GAFI, for granting incentives 
and exemptions or amending their decisions, is not based on a solid legal foundation and 
could easily be challenged. The second problem relates to the application. While, Article 
                                                        
6Sales tax is set at 5% rather than 10% 
7Article 23 of Law No. 17/2015 
8Article 20 (bis) of Law No. 17/2015, and article 36 in the Executive Regulations 
9Fields specified are Logistical Services; Internal Trade; Energy (production, transmission, or distribution 
of whether conventional, new or renewable energy); Agriculture; and Transportation (land, maritime, or 
railway). 
10A full explanation for each kind of these projects is offered in the Executive Regulations; Article 36 
11Article 93of Law No. 17/2015 
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93 empowers GAFI by giving it punitive authority, and is perceived as “very important to 
deal with blatant violations” (GAFI Senior Management Official, July 2016), exercising 
these punitive powers by the Cabinet and GAFI without setting clear basis and guidelines 
opens a door for corruption, and does not ensure against unfair preferential practices. 
However, it is argued that, “as long as GAFI has a BoD with majority from business 
people and not government representatives, this authority would not be misused. The 
penalties would only be applied in extreme cases, where GAFI is desperate with 
investors” (Board Member 1, July 2016).  It also shifts GAFI’s role to a regulator rather 
than a facilitator. 
Another important point to highlight is the use of incentives as an important tool 
for promotion. Former Principle Deputy Minister of Investment argued that, “without 
incentives, the country would be imposing certain locations, industries, or sectors for 
investment, not promoting them” (August 2016). Yet, the incentives offered in the law 
were perceived unsatisfactory for attracting investors, for instance, a Senior Management 
Official in GAFI viewed that “investors mainly invest in a location because of the tax 
incentives, and non-tax incentives provided in the law are just ineffective” (July 2016). 
This view is likely correct, since the law encourages investments in deprived and remote 
areas, which are mostly inaccessible and short of basic utilities and infrastructure, thus 
incentives in certain locations need to be sufficient to catch the investors’ interest.  
Furthermore, the Former Principle Deputy Minister of Investment stated that, “the 
general mood of the government and the country back at the time of issuing the law was 
against offering tax incentives. Frankly speaking, the MoI asked for it, but the Ministry of 
Finance refused” (August 2016). This statement shows that the government choice to the 
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type of incentives is not in line with a promotional direction and is shortsighted. “If tax 
incentives are designed in a correct manner, both the investor and the country will 
benefit” (Researcher in the Senior Management Office, July 2016), since these incentives 
will directly maximize the profit margin of the investor and will serve the State’s 
development plan through investors improving infrastructure and extending services to 
the deprived areas. 
b. Facilitating Exit Procedures 
Another amendment in this law relates to shortening the lengthy procedure of 
exiting the market, where the law
12
 binds the concerned authorities once receiving the 
liquidation request to notify the investor with any pending obligations within a maximum 
period of 120 working days. If the said period passes without the investor receiving any 
notification, then it is considered an automatic release of any liabilities.  
This amendment would positively contribute to promoting and attracting 
investments to Egypt, since it provides the investor with a guarantee for free exit from the 
market without restrictions or lengthy processes. 
c. Expanding the Scope of Work of the One Stop Shop 
The third aspect of these amendments comprise the scope of work of the OSS, 
which now extends to the announcement of the state-owned lands that are available for 
investment, and the issuance of operating licenses; two ideas, in which each is fraught 
with legal and practical difficulties that cannot be overlooked. 
o Land Allocation 
Land allocation has always been described as a huge problem and concern to 
                                                        
12Article 60 (bis) 
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investors and investment in Egypt. Therefore, the amendments dedicated a full chapter, 
from 13 articles
13
, to govern the disposition of land and real estate, in which it identified 
several flexible mechanisms for their provision to investors, such as allowing the sale, 
lease, or lease-to-own agreements of land and real estate, and giving investors the right of 
usufruct up to 30 renewable years. The law also grants the government the right to 
directly allocate state-owned land to certain “developmental projects” for free for a 
period of five years. Accordingly, GAFI is given more power in this process of land 
allocation, as the right to postpone full or partial payment of price by investors, in case of 
sale agreements, until the actual operation of their project takes place. Also, by this law 
GAFI is the only competent body in charge of offering lands as per the mentioned forms. 
Therefore, all governorates and administrative bodies with authority over lands are 
obligated to provide GAFI with full details and maps for lands that are available and 
ready for investment.  
Despite being perceived as accommodating to different investors’ needs, and a 
commendable step towards solving the land allocation problem by putting it under the 
control of a single entity, yet its applicability remains challenging due to the multiplicity 
of administrative bodies with authority over jurisdiction and pricing of lands. For 
instance, there are 4 main authorities that have jurisdiction over lands, namely the New 
Urban Communities Authority; Industrial Development Agency; General Authority For 
Tourism Development; and the General Authority For Reconstruction Projects & 
Agricultural Development, in addition to the 27 governorates, where each has a number 
of lands that can be allocated to investors. Each of these four agencies was responsible 
                                                        
13Articles 71-83 
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for pricing its lands, in accordance to technical and financial criteria and had its own 
regulations with respect to the disposition and allocation. However, Law No. 17/2015 
abolished the law of Tenders and Bids
14
, which was governing the process of land 
allocation and only pointed out to disposition. It further identified other four agencies 
responsible for pricing
15
, without elaborating on the coordination mechanisms between 
the different agencies. Also, the fact that these new amendments were imposed, without 
coordinating with these concerned administrative bodies, requiring them to substitute 
systems and regulations that were already being applied makes the enforcement of these 
new aforementioned provisions more challenging. 
Additionally, the law gives GAFI the authority to give away the state-owned 
lands and real estate for free or at a discounted price, up to 50% less than its estimated 
value
16
, even when investors are competing to purchase them. It also creates a new 
system of lottery to replace the previously applied system of the Egyptian Tenders and 
Bids Law
17
, in case of an excess demand for the lands available for investment. These 
extensive powers may provide a fertile ground for corrupt practices to thrive, and open 
the gate for favoritism that will cast doubt upon the entire process of land allocation. 
o Licensing  
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the OSS already exists. However, since the 
beginning of its application, the OSS has been fraught with practical constraints in 
regards to licensing and land allocation, which prevented it from being a fully functioning 
system. Therefore, the main idea behind the amendments added in this area is to expand 
                                                        
14Article 71 
15The General Authority for Government Services; Egyptian General Survey Authority; High Committee 
for Appraisal of State Lands; and New Urban Communities Authority 
16Articles 74 and 79 
17Egyptian Tenders and Bids Law No. 89/1998 
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the scope of work of the OSS to become functioning beyond the phase of establishing 
new companies. Accordingly, Law No. 17/2015
18
 stipulates that GAFI issues all the 
operating licenses and approvals required to start and run businesses in ‘specific 
investment domains’, which are to be determined through a presidential decree, that shall 
also stipulate the mechanism and procedures of direct coordination between GAFI and 
other concerned entities. Also, for the second time, the law excludes the use of the 
Tenders and Bids law, in cases where investors’ requests exceed the licenses available. 
Rather, it states that a selection should be made in a transparent manner, in accordance 
with the criteria specified by GAFI’s Board of Directors19. 
The problem with these provisions lies in their ambiguity sometimes and their 
consequences in other times. After nearly one year and a half from issuing the law, no 
presidential decree is issued to identify these ‘specific investment domains’, for which 
the OSS is to be applied. Whereas, the Executive Regulations, issued by the Prime 
Minister
20
, listed 11 fields with over 30 different investment activities, stating that GAFI 
is to release a guide for each activity. These guides shall indicate all the documents and 
fees required by the different concerned entities, and which ought to be submitted by the 
investors to GAFI, for obtaining the necessary licenses, approvals, permits, and contracts. 
Consequently, GAFI is committed to act on behalf of thousands of investors seeking 
operating licenses, which would turn GAFI staff into investors’ agents, dealing with the 
entire State’s administrative apparatus, from ministries and their agencies to governorates 
and its local councils. 
                                                        
18Article 51 (bis) 
19Article 54 in law and article 20 in the Executive Regulations 
20Prime Minister’s Decree No. 1820/2015 
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This makes it an idea, nearly impossible to execute without major reforms in the 
licensing regimes and a prior coordination between GAFI and the different licensing 
entities, as confirmed by one of the board members, saying: 
by designating yourself the issuer of operating licenses, you did a bottleneck. You 
compiled all the bureaucracy to your end and you still cannot issue the licenses. 
You created a backlog and you don’t have the capacity to handle it. (Board 
Member 1, July 2016) 
Furthermore, in case of having multiple investors competing for the available 
licenses, the Executive Regulations lists only three criteria
21
 that do not necessarily 
ensure transparency or guarantee against favoring one investor over another. It also does 
not refer to a mechanism to follow, in cases where competing investors similarly meet 
financial and technical requirements. 
d. Setting a Legal Framework for Dispute Resolution 
Dispute settlement is another important aspect that had considerable attention in 
the law, through adding a new chapter of 10 articles that creates three committees to deal 
with disputes. The idea from this amendment is introducing a new mechanism for out-of-
court forums, where an amicable settlement of investment disputes with the government 
takes place, before investors resort to litigation and arbitration, where time-spent and 
damages are usually high.  
The three committees offer different levels for resolving disputes; the first is the 
‘Complaints Committee’, which reviews any challenges submitted by the investor against 
GAFI administrative decisions, relating to the implementation of the Investment Law and 
                                                        
21Article 20 – Criteria are the investment costs for the project; Past Experience; and Technology Used. 
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its executive regulations. The decisions of this Committee shall be made within 60 days 
from the date of submitting the challenge, and shall be final and binding on GAFI but not 
on the investor. The law also stipulates on the creation of a ministerial ‘Committee for 
Resolution of Investment Disputes’, in the Cabinet of Ministers, nonetheless its technical 
secretariat is present inside GAFI and chaired by the Minister of Investment. The 
Committee is mainly concerned with disputes that arise between investors and any 
governmental body in connection with the implementation of the Investment Law. 
Similarly, another ‘Committee for Settlement of Investment Contract Disputes’ is formed 
to decide upon any disputes arising from investment contracts to which the State or any 
of its affiliates is a party. The decisions of both Committees shall be binding to all 
governmental parties, but again not to the investor, who still reserves the right to initiate 
the claim again through resorting to state courts or arbitral tribunals. 
Although the decisions of the committees shall be binding on all parties involved 
in the dispute, the effectiveness of these decisions depend on the enforcement 
mechanisms and the level of the commitment of administrative bodies; both of which are 
still unclear. Other than that, the gradation and multiplicity of dispute resolution methods 
is considered a strong advantage in this law and a powerful tool to GAFI. On one hand, it 
provides the investor with several alternatives to resolve any problems, before going to 
courts, arbitration, or even the Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet by turning first to 
the technical secretariat in GAFI. On the other hand, it strengthens the promotion and 
facilitation role of GAFI, which plays the mediator role between the investor and 
different governmental entities, regarding itself the lawyer of the investor and thus 
supporting him until he accesses his rights. And this itself is a powerful promotional tool 
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in terms of image building, as a current Senior Official in MoI stated that, “this technical 
secretariat is considered GAFI’s entry point in regaining the investors’ trust back, as 
playing a role in settling their disputes provides them a practical proof on the 
government seriousness in enhancing Egypt’s climate and procedures” (July 2016). 
Moreover, there is a clear conviction among officials in GAFI and MoI, that local 
investors are the real advocates and ambassadors who will help GAFI to internally and 
externally promote to its self. Therefore, resolving the local disputes according to the 
current mechanism is “one of the powerful tools with which GAFI helps investors during 
their operating phase” (OSS Officer 2, May 2016).  
e. Enhancing the Promotion Role 
The final theme reflecting the philosophy of these new amendments can be 
inferred from stipulating the creation of a “National Center for Developing and 
Promoting Investment”, as an independent division, located inside GAFI22. It indicates 
the need for separating the regulatory and promotional functions of GAFI, with the aim 
of enhancing the later. Despite being a commendable idea, the method of its 
implementation provided in this law is vague, confusing, and not well thought out. 
Regarding its structure, the law states that the Center shall be an independent 
division inside GAFI, and have a president, of high-executive cadre, to be appointed by 
the Prime Minister. First,  
This notion of ‘independence’ is not clear. Usually, the term is used in reference 
to a pressure being exercised on an entity or a person, which necessitates 
independence. It does not make any sense that the BoD, which is mandated with 
                                                        
22Article 96 of Law 17/2015 
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promoting investments, would hinder the work of the new independent Center 
with regards to its promotional duties. (Board Member 2, July 2016)  
Separating between the functions of regulation and promotion is understandable 
and valid, but this state of ‘independence’ is not clear with regards to whom the Center is 
independent from. Second, the whole idea of initiating The Center violates the 
administrative norms and protocols in force, because according to these amendments, a 
division inside GAFI would have a president with an administrative rank that overrides 
that of the Authority’s CEO and BoD. The law gives this president the right to issue the 
internal bylaws and executive decisions related to financial, technical, and administrative 
matters of the Center, without approval from anyone in GAFI, which supersedes the role 
of the Board of Directors, even though the president of the Center is one of the board 
members. Additionally, there are other obstacles related to performing its mandates, 
however they will be highlighted in the following section discussing GAFI’s institutional 
analysis. 
This section tried to present an objective analysis of the features of Law No 
17/2015, summarized in Figure (6), focusing on some amendments that directly affect the 
work of GAFI and the investment climate as a whole. The analysis reveals that, although 
the objective behind enacting this law is to restore investors’ confidence in Egypt’s 
business environment, however it resulted in adding more ambiguity, due to vagueness of 
some provisions, doubtfulness regarding enforcement mechanisms, and uncertainty about 
proper coordination between the different governmental entities.  
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Moreover, looking at what the law offers at each business stage shows that it did 
not offer much to the investor. For example, the entry 
incentives, which are considered a strategic tool 
for attracting and promoting investments, were 
not tactically designed according to a clear 
methodology, which in turn questions their 
effectiveness in attracting more FDI and in 
contributing to the country’s growth and 
development objectives. Similarly, its provisions 
did not offer real, new improvements to simplify 
procedures or accelerate processes and 
transactions with regards to the land allocation 
and license obtainment systems. Therefore, the law does not guarantee a smooth 
operating stage of business.  
Also, with regards to the system of exiting the market, it needs further reform in 
order to render Egypt more attractive to investment (Helmy, 2005). The law provided 
only one amendment to shorten a lengthy process relating to market exit, but still, full 
bankruptcy legislation that facilitates the exit process, and assures the potential investors 
that they can reallocate their resources whenever needed, is lacking.  
The following section completes what this section has started through an 
institutional analysis of GAFI, which will further stress how significant legislative 
stability can be, in impacting the investment environment in general and the investment 
institutions in particular. 
 Permits the government to participate in investment 
projects, using state-owned land.  
 
 GAFI has potential for giving free land.  
 
 GAFI can provide land at reduced prices, at a 
discounted rate with a maximum of 50% of the 
estimated value of such land or real estates. 
 
 GAFI has the right to terminate the land acquired if 
progress is not made with the project 
 
 Creates a National Center for Development and 
Investment Promotion to be under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Investment. 
 
 Shifts GAFI’s role towards a regulator and takes the 
main promotion function from it. 
Source: Author Constructed 
Figure (6) Features of Law 17/2015 
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II. Institution Analysis 
A. Organizational Elements 
a. Legal Status, Mandate and Organizational Structure 
Examining the IPA’s mode of creation; whether established by decree or law, and 
institutional form; whether governmental; quasi-governmental; or private, are very 
important to emphasize at the beginning of any institutional analysis. They represent the 
legal foundation for an IPA, which directly influence its mandate and powers, and in turn 
its capacity to promote investments.  
GAFI was established by a presidential decree No. 284/1997 to be the main 
governmental entity, in authority of regulating and promoting investments in Egypt, 
through applying the provisions of Investment Law No. 8/1997 and its superseding law 
No. 17/2015. Undoubtfully, the decree acknowledged GAFI’s importance, giving it a 
solid legal foundation and a degree of autonomy that was further strengthened by the 
issuance of Law No. 13/2004, and presidential decree No. 316/2004, wherewith GAFI’s 
role was redefined from a regulation-oriented to a more promotion and facilitation 
oriented agency, in addition its governance was strengthened, through appointing three 
deputies to the Chairmen, and expanding the number of its Board of Directors (BoD)
23
 to 
include more private-sector representatives.  
However, the latest amendment of Law No. 17/2015 has changed the governance 
mechanism of GAFI
24
. Instead of having an independent Chairman serving as a key 
communication channel between GAFI’s supervisory BoD and the concerned Minister of 
Investment, the new law stipulates that the Minister of Investment chairs the BoD and a 
                                                        
23The Board included 13 membersin total, Chairman appointed by the President; 3 Vice Chairmen; and 9 
private sector representatives and other experienced individuals, appointed by the Prime Minister 
24Article 88 of Law 17/2015 
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO) manages GAFI; a change that will have adverse 
consequences with regards to GAFI’s autonomy and positioning in the government, and 
which will further be discussed in detail.  
The consequences of this amendment demonstrate how significant the mode of 
creation is, and how it is often indicative to the amount of power an IPA holds and the 
degree of support it gets from other governmental entities. That is especially true because 
decrees are often weaker than laws, since they may simply be modified, overturned, or 
even dropped with any altering in governments or policies. In GAFI’s case, since the 
decree whereby it is created has less legal power than a law, its capacity as an effective 
IPA that is able to take dissuasive and proportionate enforcement actions may be 
hindered by the maze of existing laws, in case these enforcement actions conflicted with 
any other existing law. Thus, in the case of GAFI, its capacity to carry out its promotional 
role effectively will be defined by the degree of political consensus among ministries 
over its importance as an IPA, and contingent on the amount of support it gets from other 
governmental agencies.  
 Mandate 
As previously discussed, GAFI has a broad mandate, which is further reflected in 
the large number of functional divisions it has. The extensiveness of these mandates and 
their different natures require GAFI to wear many hats; a hat of a regulator as an 
administrative body supervising investments that also has some jurisdictions of an 
oversight nature; a second hat of a promoter and facilitator, carrying out promotional 
activities and offering services to investors; as well as, a hat of a punisher in other times, 
with an authority to reduce the tax exemption given to companies that violate the law and 
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regulations. Interviews indicated that playing these numerous roles overburdens GAFI’s 
staff and adversely affects carrying out the main promotion function, leading to a poor 
performance from GAFI as a facilitator and promoter. A Senior Management Official in 
GAFI stressed this saying: “We are being absorbed in our role as a regulator, which 
makes us drift away from promotion and facilitation” (July 2016). Moreover, Board 
Member 2 declared that, “the Board hardly finds time to discuss promotion in its 
meetings” (August 2016). 
Additionally, it is important to point out that, although the new law stipulated on 
creating a “National Center for Developing and Promoting Investment” to avoid 
overlapping responsibilities and allow effective coordination, yet it has not been created 
or shaped despite the passage of one and a half years on issuing the law. The same 
division in GAFI is still carrying out the promotion role. This delay in enforcement 
supports the assumption that this law came with amendments that were not well thought 
of, especially with regards to implementation. It further reflects that investment 
promotion is not on the top of the government's priority list and questions the intentions 
of the government towards it. Another point to highlight is the reporting mechanism of 
the Center. According to the new law, the Center reports to the Minister of Investment 
and not the Prime Minister, which again does not strategically serve in positioning the 
Center favorably among other governmental counterparts. 
 Organizational structure 
GAFI’s current structure is composed of a Board of Directors headed by the 
Minister of Investment, a CEO, two Vice CEOs, and two assistants for the CEO. The 
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Authority is organized into 12 functional divisions
25
, with central and general 
departments underneath each. The following chart provides the general organizational 
structure of GAFI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                        
25 Technical Office; Quality and Performance Improvement; Free Zones; Promotion; Investment in 
Governorates; Investment Services; Investment Policies; Information, Documentation and Decision 
Support Center; General Assembly; Economic Performance Follow Up; Companies; Legal Affairs. In 
addition to a Media and Public Relations Central Unit, and a Security Central Unit. 
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Figure (7) GAFI’s Organizational Structure 
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Source: The author; based on interviews with employees at GAFI, 2016 
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b.  IPA’s Relationship to Government 
Now that the legal structure and organizational chart are outlined, the political 
positioning of GAFI in the government and how it is perceived among its counterparts 
can be looked over in more depth. 
GAFI has previously been an affiliate to MoI, nevertheless it reported directly to 
the Prime Minister. It was also designated an autonomous agency, in terms of having an 
independent budget, and an independent board of directors, responsible for everything 
related to the Authority’s financial, administrative and technical matters, including its 
organizational structure, internal regulations, executive resolutions and so on. This 
autonomy has given GAFI an advantageous position among other governmental 
institutions and leverage among all ministries. Abolishing this state “downgraded GAFI, 
and put it in an inferior position among other government agencies” (Board Member 1, 
July 2016). 
Although, it’s often argued that the presence of a minister is essential for moving 
things forward, setting a national policy for the State with regard to investment, and 
identifying an economic direction, and despite the importance of all these objectives, 
nevertheless, they can all still be achieved without breaching the autonomy of GAFI. In 
fact, decreasing the degree of this independence would be impeding to GAFI with regards 
to performing its facilitation mandate, since an additional layer is created between the 
investor and GAFI for instance,  
having a CEO, instead of a Chairman has stripped a large portion of GAFI’s 
powers in favor of the Ministry, which in turn strips the delegated authority that 
was granted to some heads of divisions. This would complicate and slow things, 
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since the minister has become the ultimate decision-maker and it would be 
difficult to regularly reach him. (OSS Officer 2, May 2016) 
Beside the degree of autonomy, the effectiveness of GAFI directly depends on the 
quality of political relations it has with other ministries and agencies and on their 
perceptions towards it as an IPA. Interviews show an enormous weakness in mutual 
relations. Coordination between GAFI and different ministries only takes place when 
there is an urge, and is often limited to matters of high priority to the Country’s 
leadership. However, when it comes to boosting promotional efforts, both the 
coordination level and mechanism need extensive enhancement. For example, a 
researcher in the Senior Management Office revealed that, 
there is a sort of good collaboration between GAFI and different government 
official regarding ‘improving the business climate’, because it’s a prime issue for 
the Presidency right now. Nonetheless, ministries are completely uncooperative 
when it comes to mapping the investment opportunities. (July 2016). 
GAFI ascribes this lack of coordination to the fact that “government officials do 
not communicate with each other, and do not want to share or convey information” 
(Senior Management Official, July 2016). On one hand, this can be attributed to the 
differences in cultures and mentalities; a culture of service versus a culture of enforcing 
rules, which is further reflected in the mentality “between GAFI as a facilitator and other 
agencies as regulators and implementers of law” (OSS Officer 2, May 2016). On the 
other hand, it can be attributable to power-relations between ministries and agencies, or 
from perceiving GAFI as a competing or threatening entity that aims at absorbing their 
mandates, for instance OSS Officer 1 stated that,  
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some agencies will never accept or allow GAFI to have an upper hand over them 
or take any of their duties. These agencies depend on their institutional strength, 
in terms of being founded by a presidential decree or having a strong chairman 
who is connected with high-level decision-makers in the State. (May 2016).  
Another illustration is given by the Former Chairman of IDA, who referred to a 
stressed relationship between the two institutions that dates back to 2005, the time of 
founding IDA, saying: “IDA was created with deliberate intent to be merged later with 
GAFI, similar to the Companies’ Authority, which was merged with GAFI in 2004. 
However, with a strong Minister of Trade and Industry back then, this move was 
resisted”(August 2016). This example explains the resistance that some agencies hold 
against GAFI, driven by fear that it becomes an umbrella agency that would absorb their 
power. It also reflects the influence of the power relations among strong ministries in the 
government. 
Furthermore, there is a perception among some government officials that GAFI is 
a valueless institution to them or an incompetent one in providing certain services. A 
Senior Official at IMC
26
 stressed that, “GAFI has an unclear mandate, which does not 
show how it complements other agencies” (August 2016).  Additionally, on the ground, it 
does not provide them with any sort of support. This reveals a missing link in the chain 
between FDI and domestic investment. Likewise, the relationship between GAFI and an 
important Ministry like MoPMAR, which plays the most important role in the process of 
outlining developmental plans, is limited to mutual collaboration for holding conferences 
or collecting data for outlining strategic documents like the Sustainable Development 
                                                        
26Industrial modernization Center focuses on supporting the industrial enterprises and works with GAFI in 
the matchmaking program. 
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Strategy (SDS); Egypt Vision 2030. Principle Deputy Minister of Planning stated that in 
preparing the national plan for social and economic development, MoPMAR sometimes 
need studies on certain industries or sectors. However, they don’t consult GAFI, because 
it “is mainly an executer and a regulator. Its promotional role is trivial and it promotes 
for sectors, lacking vision and strategy” (August, 2016). Instead, MoPMAR resorts to 
multinational corporations and specialized private sector companies.  
Having an effective OSS, that assists investors with licenses services, is an idea 
that has stumbled in execution. In investigating the reasons, Former Chairman of IDA 
expressed high approbation to the idea of streamlining procedures and stressed that“IDA 
doesn’t want to meet investors”, and affirmed that “IDA had several meetings with 
GAFI’s senior management to discuss activating the OSS. However, it was GAFI’s 
management that clearly stated their shortage of qualified people to deal with the permits 
and licenses issue” (August 2016). Moreover, it is claimed that, the new law gives GAFI 
a mandate it cannot fulfill and grants it undeserved rights, for example, Senior Official at 
IMC expressed his disapproval on the law, and his astonishment regarding the related 
articles wondering; “How can GAFI grant operating licenses, when it is not qualified to 
do inspection and make sure that everything is in place? This is a sole right for IDA” 
(August 2016).  
This part reveals that Ministries and agencies are working in isolated islands. 
Their relationship is not systematic or based on an effective coordination mechanism. 
Efforts are fragmented rather than complementing and institutions’ effectiveness is tied to 
the power and strength of each minister. Also, GAFI is imaged as an executer not as a 
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promoter or a facilitator, and that’s why, it is perceived a competitor instead of a 
complementing agency.  
Developing high-quality political relations with government ministries and 
agencies is key to providing a real facilitation and high-quality services for potential 
investors, which would only be achieved through consensus on the important role of 
GAFI as an IPA that facilitates only and does not execute.  
Therefore, autonomy would provide GAFI with a degree of insulation from the 
government and its conflicting relations. In addition, it would maintain its stability that 
can be influenced by continuous reshuffling of governments, which will in turn give it a 
greater chance for correcting any negative image and for positioning itself as a mediator 
between investment opportunities and different government ministries and agencies. 
These adverse consequences can also be minimized through a system of monitoring and 
accountability, where each agency has a clear mandate, knows its integrative role in the 
economic system, and is being held accountable. 
c. IPA’s Relationship with Private Sector 
As much as the IPAs’ relationship to the government informs the potential of an 
IPA to attract FDI and promote investment, its relationship with private sector and the 
degree to which they are involved within the IPA are often as important. In this part, 
three things are being examined; the representation of private sector in GAFI’s Board; its 
effectiveness in terms of its participation in GAFI’s functioning; and GAFI’s linkage to 
other business communities. 
The framework of connecting GAFI to the private sector is realized through 
incorporating private-sector representatives into the Authority’s governance structure. 
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Ever since its inception, GAFI had a BoD that has constantly been private sector 
dominated. Today, eight out of 13 board members represent the private sector, including 
the Chairman of the Egyptian Federation of Investors Associations; Representative of the 
Egyptian Federation of Investors Association; President of the Egyptian Businessmen’s 
Association; President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce; Chairman of 
Egypt’s Junior Businessmen's Association; Representative of the Federation of Egyptian 
Industries; Chairman of BanqueMisr; and a member with legal expertise. Therefore, 
when it comes to the representation, the private sector is definitely well represented. 
However, its effectiveness depends on its functionality in the Board, which in turn 
influences the effectiveness of GAFI. 
Although the composition of the BoD is well thought out and inclusive to 
powerful business representatives, its effectiveness is debatable for many reasons. First, 
the board has been in limbo for 5 years; since the Revolution of 2011, the BOD meetings 
have not been conducted regularly. There have been changes in some members and five 
different ministers for investment have been in charge, where with each minister, the 
BoD starts all over again. Second, with every board meeting, members get stuck with 
administrative lots that need to be authorized and approved by the board, as reported by 
Board Member 1,“the BoD time is consumed in approving administrative matters from 
all divisions” (July 2016). Third and most importantly, there is an apparent difference in 
views regarding the role the BoD should play in GAFI between GAFI’s senior 
management and executive board, on one hand and the members of board from the 
private sector on the other hand, for example, GAFI’s management reported that the 
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private sector is well represented in the board by titles, but not by persons who 
are operative in its governance. Almost all of the members hold several top-level 
positions and have busy schedules; for example, when a sub-committee is formed 
inside the BoD, I cannot ask any of them to head it. I need more dynamic people 
who are involved in day-to-day activities (GAFI Senior Management Official, 
July 2016). 
Whereas, the board members consider themselves a consultancy board that works 
with the executive team in GAFI to offer advice and strategic directions, but are not 
supposed to get deeply involved in the execution matters. According to Board Member 1: 
The members of Board have a vision and a wealth of experience in different 
fields, which they share with GAFI’s management and executive team, and it 
depends on them to turn this vision into reality and use this shared expertise. If 
they are not going to use it, then they are useless. (July 2016) 
These reasons reveal that the real problem in GAFI exists in its mandate, which is 
“very wide and confusing; is it a regulator or a promoter, or an entity that establishes 
companies, or manages the Free Zones? Being any of them is fine, but all of them is not” 
(Board Member 2, August 2016).The Authority’s overwhelming mandate is impairing the 
management from prioritizing setting a clear direction and a strategic vision to promote 
investments in Egypt. Furthermore, it accounts for the unproductivity of board meetings 
beyond dealing with administrative matters. Also, the variance in perspectives with 
respect to the role of the BoD, discloses the gap between governmental and business 
mindsets, which are not necessarily opposite, but they are different. It further uncovers 
the misunderstanding of roles pertaining to setting a strategy and executing it, where 
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setting a strategy should mainly be concerned with where GAFI wants to go and how 
framing and guiding all of its decisions. That’s why it is a sophisticated process that 
involves collecting and analyzing data, generating insights and identifying smart paths 
forward. Whereas execution is about, what activities to fulfill, steady follow up, and 
monitoring and evaluation. These roles here are not fruitlessly distinct, but rather 
integrated. 
One thing here is left to point out, although different Chairmen had the same 
powers, not all of them exercised it in the same way. For example, in 2004, GAFI had a 
chairman from a private sector background. He appointed 3 deputies, also from private 
sector backgrounds and delegated authority to each of them. He realized the need for 
another board to deal with the regular administrative affairs, accelerate things up, and 
achieve progress. Thus, he used the power given to him by law and created a Board of 
Trustees to include representatives and chairmen of concerned and influential 
governmental entities such as IDA, Tax Authority, General Authority for Tourism 
Promotion, Federation of Egyptian Banks, Federation of Egyptian Chambers of 
Commerce and other organizations; representatives of Egyptian business associations; 
prominent businessmen; Deputy Governor of the CBE; in addition to others of legal and 
business expertise. Yet, the Board of Trustees ceased to function in 2010, and was never 
formed to assume responsibility afterwards. This emphasizes the importance of 
leadership, which realizes the challenges and does what it takes to efficiently achieve its 
mandates. As stated by a Senior Official 2 in MoI,“the biggest challenge encountering 
GAFI is the absence of a competent administration that has a clear mission and vision. 
Whoever manages this authority needs to know exactly what he wants to do and where he 
82 
  
wants GAFI to reach” (June 2016). 
Apart from the board composition, the institutional linkage of GAFI with the 
private sector is very weak or even nonexistent, although there are strong businesses 
communities in Egypt, with which GAFI can establish constructive relationships and 
enhance its overall performance. For instance, the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Egypt plays a powerful role in enhancing economic and investment ties between the two 
countries, through hosting all the American investors in Egypt and carrying out numerous 
throughout the year. Similarly, the Federation of Egyptian Industries regularly meets its 
counterparts in Europe and Arab countries. Also, there are many Chambers of Commerce 
and Business Councils that are very strong business-to-business communication venues, 
in addition to other Egyptian associations like the Egyptian Business Association and 
Alexandra Business Association, which are very active and professional bodies.All of 
these entities represent a robust linkage and offer strong communication venues to the 
private sector, “however the relationship between GAFI and these organizations is not 
institutionalized” (Board Member 1, July 2016).  
In line with the evidence provided by Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004), 
establishing an operational framework for interaction between IPAs and private sector 
can positively contribute to increasing GAFI’s credibility among foreign investors. It 
further enables the IPA to identify and understand the obstacles of investment from the 
investors’ perspective, which would in turn empower GAFI to play a tougher role in 
policy advocacy supported by the private sector. Finally, it can help GAFI move towards 
a more quasi-governmental structure rather than a purely rigid governmental one, which 
would make it easier to adopt a business culture closer and more suitable to its 
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promotional efforts. 
Lastly, the research findings correspond with Wells and Wint (2000), in stressing 
that, “investment promotion is, in fact, more like activities typical of the private sector, 
particularly marketing…[that] requires a continuous liaison with the private sector” (p. 
56). However, findings disagree with Morrisset and Andrews Johnson (2004), in 
considering that, “the higher the number of private members [in the IPA advisory board], 
the greater IPA effectiveness” (p.49). Interviews indicate that the number does not 
necessary reflect or guarantee enhancing the IPA’s effectiveness, but rather a clear 
mandate and a strong leadership do, because only then, the participation of private sector 
in the IPA functioning is guaranteed. 
d. IPA’s Resources 
Financial and human resources are a key indicator that determines the IPA 
effectiveness. Since the focus is on the role of GAFI as a promoter, the research only 
concentrates on the Promotion Division, where two elements are investigated as 
indicative to the amount of attention and support GAFI provides to its promotional and 
facilitation role and in turn denotes its effectiveness as an IPA. The two elements are the 
percentage of staff dedicated to promotion from the total number of GAFI’s staff and 
their qualification level, in addition to the size of budget allocated to promotion. 
GAFI has a total of 2,391
27
 employees working in all its divisions and branches 
across Egypt, out of which 97 employees are working in the Promotion Division. GAFI’s 
Promotion staff is mainly devoted for the image building and investment generation 
functions, in addition to providing after care and business matchmaking services. While 
                                                        
27The statistics provided in this section were obtained from GAFI and analyzed by the researcher. 
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the number of staff alone does not account for GAFI’s effectiveness in attracting 
investment, however an only 4 percent of employees signify that the main attentiveness 
of GAFI is not given to its role as a promoter.  
In addition, through examining their qualification level and wage policies, 
interviews indicated that GAFI is short of skilled people who can understand the business 
strategies of promotion or deal with foreign investors, for example, although the Central 
Promotion Department is internally divided by regions, a Senior Official in Promotion 
Division conveyed that he is “suffering from the lack of language skilled staff inside the 
division” (Senior Official 1, June 2016). Furthermore, a member of Board indicated that 
calibers are very weak inside GAFI, saying: “a year ago, the BoD conducted interviews 
for job promotions, and most of GAFI staff and those who are working on promotion 
failed the exam” (Board Member 1, July 2016). This lack of skill and expertise can be 
attributed to the poor wages provided, especially after the Revolution of January 2011, 
since “the application of the maximum wage law has caused well qualified people to 
leave”(Senior Official 1 in Promotion division, June 2016). It can also be resultant from 
the absence of a “clear mechanism for human resource development for staff to be 
upgraded” (Board Member 1, July 2016). 
As for the financial resources, GAFI is considered one of the strong economic 
authorities in Egypt, which has a sustainable funding source based on fees charged for 
services provided to companies in the free zones. Its budget is always over one billion 
Egyptian pounds, and interviewees confirmed that GAFI does not suffer from any budget 
shortage, while, Board member 1 affirmed that “GAFI is a rich agency that has now 
deposits amounting over 3 billion, with proceeds in dollars” (July 2016), and a Senior 
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Official stressed that “GAFI supported the government and the Central Bank of Egypt by 
over 1 billion Egyptian pounds in the past few years” (Senior Official 1 in Promotion 
division, June 2016), there is no specified budget of the Promotion Division. Yet, there is 
a line item allocation in the budget for promotional activities, including advertising, 
publishing, printing, and PR costs, with an average of 22 million Egyptian pounds in the 
periods between year 2011 and 2015. 
Still, these amounts, although reported sufficient and denotes a potential to attract 
FDI, do not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of GAFI as a promoter, since they are 
not allocated based on a program or by function. 
B. Functional Elements 
Now that the significance of GAFI’s organizational elements, including its 
relationship with the government and private sector, are outlined above, the institutional 
analysis would be accomplished by putting emphasis on the functional elements as 
indicated in the conceptual framework. Therefore, the following part scrutinizes each of 
the four main IPA functions to explore how these functions influence GAFI’s capacity to 
promote and facilitate investments and in turn attract more FDI. 
Although the research primarily focuses on the ‘Promotion Division’, the four 
functions are carried out through other divisions as well.  
a. Image Building  
Image building is the heart of investment promotion, and which if carried out 
correctly, smoothens performing the three other investment promotion functions. It is 
simply a marketing activity meant to portray a country as a trusted investment brand and 
its investment climate as favorable. Therefore, it is fundamental for IPAs to give it 
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considerable attention, especially in countries suffering from political and economic 
fluctuations like Egypt. Investigating this function, the research focused on two main 
elements; a strategy or plan being followed; and the tools utilized for achieving this plan. 
After shifting its role from a regulator to a promoter, GAFI was very proactive in 
building the country’s image. It followed a firm strategic approach to sell the country as 
an appealing location, through conveying structured and consistent messaging of Egypt’s 
value proposition and economic reforms to prospective and existing investors. This can 
be inferred by looking at the FDI levels (Figure 2), which leaped from $2 billion in 2004 
to $13.2 billion in 2008, in addition to the fundamental economic and legislative reforms, 
as well as institutional reforms with regards to GAFI that were witnessed in the period 
between 2004 and 2009. Additionally, during this period Egypt was named a top 
reformer for four consecutive years in the Doing Business Report, and was a top regional 
recipient of foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, this approach has weakened in the 
past few years and highly needs revisiting, especially with the aftermath of January 2011 
Revolution. 
Interviews revealed that GAFI has a strategy for targeting investments; however it 
does not have a clear strategy for building the image of Egypt. Even though, from an 
image-building perspective, investment promotion cannot be viewed standalone from 
promoting the entire country. Moreover, “the political context and security situation of 
the host country always precede the investment decisions” (Former Principle Deputy 
Minister of Investment, August 2016), and Egypt has witnessed many events that altered 
the political and economic landscape and undermined confidence in the Egyptian 
economy post 2011. All of these reasons require a competent IPA, capable of promoting 
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Egypt’s image, and answering all questions relating to the political and security situation. 
Therefore, the approach of GAFI that “is only limited to promoting certain sectors, but 
not promoting Egypt” (Board Member 1, July 2016) needs to be reconsidered. 
As for the tools currently used, they entail GAFI’s website, where information 
about investing in Egypt is disseminated in an organized and consistent manner. 
However, information on how to start a business is only available in Arabic. In addition, 
the contact information for GAFI, and links to other governmental portals are also 
accessible on the website, along with monthly and quarterly bulletins, which are also not 
published in a regular manner; the last published ones date back to 2014. 
Promoting abroad is another tool utilized by GAFI through cooperating with 
Egyptian embassies abroad, commercial representation offices, and Egyptians 
expatriates. GAFI has developed a cooperation program with the Commercial 
Representation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) with the objective of holding 
seminars and meetings with diplomatic and commercial attachés, where “the promotion 
division usually meet the newly appointed ambassadors and present GAFI promotion 
officers, in charge of the countries they are heading to, in order to facilitate future 
cooperation together in attracting prospective investors” (Senior Official 2, Promotion 
Division, June 2016). The Authority is also keen on opening communication and 
dialogue channels with Egyptian expatriates, through participating in the annual 
‘Consular Tours’28 to communicate the latest country reforms and promote investment 
opportunities to them. GAFI also works closely with a contracted international PR 
agency to assist it in organizing conferences, seminars and promotion missions and do the 
                                                        
28These are annual follow-up visits arranged with MoFA to meet with Egyptians abroad. 
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necessary advertising. 
While, all of these efforts and forms of cooperation are important and shall 
contribute positively to promotion efforts and FDI levels, they still need to be guided by a 
clear image or identity that the government wants to brand Egypt for, in order to increase 
the effectiveness of these efforts. Furthermore, they are counted conventional, old tools, 
despite having the opportunity to use more innovative tools, for example “Egypt has held 
an International Economic Conference in 2015, in which a lot of world leaders and 
biggest international economic institutions attended. However, it did not build on its 
momentum to strengthen the country’s image” (Former Principle Deputy Minister of 
Investment, August 2016). 
The distracted performance on this function can be attributed to the different roles 
GAFI plays, which impedes it from prioritizing promotion and therefore, its basic 
functions. Another reason could be the revealed lack of consensus among the 
governmental ministries and agencies on the significance of GAFI’s role. Most 
importantly, the absence of a clear economic vision for the country as Board Member one 
expressed “If we don’t have an economic vision, then what are we promoting Egypt for?” 
(July 2016). All of these reasons stress the need for “an entity dedicated to promotion 
with different sectoral focuses, yet promoting one image for the country” (Former 
Principle Deputy Minister of Investment, August 2016). 
b. Investment Generation  
Investment generation is regarded as a more focused, strategic technique that is 
adopted by IPAs worldwide. It is intended to draw FDI in higher quality and quantity, 
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and should also help the country to attract investments in sectors that will serve and 
enlarge the impact of its economic development objectives.  
GAFI acts as an investment generator by following a sector-focused approach in 
promotion by targeting 13 sectors
29
. Initial information on each sector is available on 
GAFI’s website, including Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), sector assessment, growth 
drivers, and market structure. In addition, the socio-economic importance is displayed in 
summary. There is also an ‘investment opportunities’ section under each of these sectors, 
listing a number of projects with details on the allocation mechanism and the authority in-
charge for each.  
However, GAFI’s targeting strategy does not seem tactically well defined. On one 
hand, the number of targeted sectors, already identified and placed on GAFI’s website, is 
huge for an effective targeting strategy. Also, there is no indication for any specific 
investment opportunities under nine out of the 13 target sectors. It can be understood that 
choosing 13 different economic sectors is aimed at reflecting the broad range of 
economic activities in Egypt, where investors can invest in. However, a fewer number 
would maximize the probability of attracting more FDI in quantity and quality.  
Furthermore, beyond being ‘indicated in the State’s annual development plan’, the 
rationale behind choosing these 13 sectors is not fairly clear to some of GAFI and MoI 
employees, who are in different management positions, and responsible for promoting 
projects and opportunities. For example, pertaining to the selection criteria of these 13 
sectors, interviewees’ responses were contradicting and varied between, “these sectors 
                                                        
29Health Care; Communications and Information Technology; Mining; Renewable Energy; Logistics and 
Transportation; Pharmaceuticals; Real Estate and Construction; Agribusiness; Engineering and Electronics; 
Textiles; Retail; Tourism; and Petrochemicals 
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were chosen to match the plan prepared by the Ministry of Planning, other than that 
there is no logic for us as GAFI’s staff”(Assistant to the Minister of Investment, June 
2016);“The choice is based on an old study conducted in GAFI, which designated these 
13 sectors as promising sectors”(Researcher in the Senior Management Office, July 
2016); “We are now targeting six sectors not 13, based on the current orientation of the 
State”(Senior Management Official in GAFI, July 2016). It should be highlighted that the 
six sectors indicated by the last respondent include different sectors than the identified 13 
ones. These conflicting statements from interviewees reveal the lack of communication 
among the internal hierarchical actors and other external governmental actors, who 
directly work on investment, and further confirm the assumption that this targeting 
strategy is not well defined.  
On the other hand, the targeting strategy does not appear as clearly communicated 
as it should among all other concerned and involved parties. For example, Commercial 
Registration Offices abroad are technically affiliated to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, and are mandated with enhancing the image and level of trade among other 
countries. And since any investment will respectively raise the volumes of trade between 
countries, these offices are considered as a vital partner in promoting and implementing 
the investment strategy abroad. However, as Senior Official 2 in GAFI pointed out: 
There are times when the goal of Commercial Representation is to increase the 
investment between the two countries by making foreigners export to us, which 
will in turn raise the trade volume in their favor. However, this drains Egypt’s 
hard currency… [Moreover, when] GAFI communicates with them to explore the 
possibility of convincing some of these investors to invest and open a business in 
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Egypt, instead of exporting to us. Some are cooperative, but others are stubborn 
and don’t collaborate at all. (June 2016) 
From one side, this situation indicates and confirms a blurred or an absence of 
communication of an overarching economic vision and thus a strong, well-defined 
strategy for generating investments that should align with the country’s national 
economic developmental objectives. This can be depicted in the different goals and 
approaches of different ministries and agencies, which sometimes contradict or overlap. 
The lack of unified strategy and coordination among different governmental entities 
further reflects a policy gap among key ministries and government institutions that 
impedes any effective promotion efforts, and negatively affects the investment 
generation, which in turn, harms the country and adversely contributes to Egypt’s 
economic growth and development. 
From the other side, this poorly defined strategy could be resultant also from the 
weak human resources in the promotion department and in GAFI in general. First, the 
promotion is done by country not by economic sector. Shifting to sector-based units that 
have qualified staff for different sectors will enhance the promotion efforts and will allow 
GAFI staff to effectively follow up on their promotional campaigns. Second, GAFI does 
not have a proper database because their public sector accounting is not functioning, for 
example, Board Member 1, explains that 
All budgets of companies are approved from GAFI, so they should have a 
database of budgets, through which they could know the increase in capital 
whether paid-up or issued share, the real investments, increase in employment, 
and arrange all of this by sector. These data offer important ingredients for 
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effective indicators to marketable sectors that can be used in promotion and 
targeting. (July 2016) 
Though stimulating investors all over the world, to pour their investments in the 
Egyptian market, needs a well-articulated targeting strategy that aims at branding Egypt 
and strategically placing it in the FDI-attracting markets. However, experience show that 
investment generation works best, when the actual business climate in a country is better 
than the perceptions presumed by investors (Loewendahl, 2001). Therefore, GAFI should 
shift its promotional efforts to investment generation and sector targeting only after it 
achieves a favorable image for business climate among potential investors. Only then can 
GAFI focus on prioritizing some sectors and even some industries within these sectors. 
Interviewees also stressed the need for having proper tools for investment 
generation, namely tax incentives and reform agenda. Former Principle Deputy Minister 
of Investment stated that, “he, who has the money, dictates on the country the type of 
investment. You cannot impose a certain direction or sector on investors, short of drastic 
tax incentives” (August 2016). Similarly, Board Member 1 stressed that, “an investor 
knows very well where he wants to go and where the money flows. He only needs to see a 
clear identified reform agenda” (July 2016) that guarantees a stable business 
environment. This is only when GAFI can identify the possibilities and opportunities for 
investors. 
Thus, GAFI should primarily focus its promotional efforts on image building, 
then set a strategy reflecting a long-term, thought of vision that considers Egypt’s current 
and future challenges. Several approaches can be pursued for this aim. For example, the 
strategy should consider attracting new and innovative types of investments, where Egypt 
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intends to enter their market in the future. A second effective targeting approach would 
be focusing on the interdependent industries that create synergy between the different 
sectors, or targeting sectors that are highly oriented towards export.  
Not only will these approaches strengthen the targeting strategy and enhance 
Egypt’s opportunities in attracting more FDI, both in quantity and quality, but also will 
inform GAFI and the government about the magnitude and kind of desirable change and 
infrastructures that Egypt needs to pursue, in order to be capable of attracting more 
sophisticated types of industries. 
c. Investors Servicing and Facilitation 
Investor servicing and facilitation simply completes and crowns the efforts of 
creating a positive national image and generating investments for a country, by turning 
them into real, tangible investments. This function entails OSS services, in addition to 
business matchmaking and after care services. 
 One-Stop Shop 
As identified in the overview, a OSS
30
system was established inside GAFI in 
2002, and was later reformatted in 2004 to streamline mandatory procedures and abolish 
redundant ones. It works under a separate Division inside GAFI, namely the ‘Investment 
Services Division’, and has representatives from 47 ministries and government agencies, 
offering multiple services to investors. It also has five branches
31
 in different 
governorates that offer almost the same services that are offered at the main Cairo OSS. 
Coordination occurs regularly between all branches, which are all connected through an 
internal department that follows up and coordinates between them and the central OSS in 
                                                        
30One Stop Shop inside GAFI was established according to Presidential decree 79/2002. 
31Alexandria, Ismailya, Assiut, 10
th
 of Ramadan, and 6
th
 of October 
94 
  
Cairo. Ongoing efforts to exchange good practices between all OSS branches take place 
through an annual program for unification and standardization of procedures, based on 
which a “Procedural Guide for Internal Investment" manual gets updated. 
The OSS provides investors with services during different investment phases. Pre-
establishment phase services entail responding to investors’ inquiries and providing them 
with information about the different investment schemes, guarantees and incentives, 
documents required for starting a business and the needed fees accordingly. 
Establishment phase services cover the process of starting up a business, which normally 
takes 48 hours and two hours in case the investor applied for a VIP application. Investors 
only deal with a single window
32
 during this stage, where they complete all the required 
documents is an automated process, filling out digital templates to accelerate the process. 
Post-establishment phase services include a range of governmental services; technical 
services; legal services; publication services; and tax exemption services. A summary on 
each of these services is depicted in (Annex 1). 
Since its inception, establishment has been the most successful and smooth 
service provided through the OSS. Whereas, post-establishment services, in contrary are 
regarded the weakest due to the lack of coordination between GAFI and the entities 
involved in this stage, especially when it comes to services provided by entities with 
land- jurisdiction and licensing authority.  
According to Board member 1, the OSS fails to deliver these support services 
                                                        
32The process takes place through a lawyer and a GAFI officer. The lawyer ensures first that all papers 
presented by either the client or his agent, are complete and valid. Then, the officer acts on the investor’s 
behalf in carrying out all the necessary steps for registering a company and following up on the whole 
process that involves seven different agencies beside GAFI; Syndicate of Lawyers; The Union of Trade 
Chambers; Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority; Public Notary; Commercial Registry; Tax Authority; 
and the General Authority for Social Insurance. The investor is only required for signing in the Public 
Notary. 
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because “it has become a front office for all the bureaucracy in Egypt” (July 2016). 
Instead of being a one single entity, where investors can obtain all their necessary 
paperwork for starting and operating their businesses in a streamlined and harmonized 
process, the OSS has become a one extra shop, where representatives from different 
ministries are just liaison officers, whose role is limited to receiving requests and 
necessary documents from the investor, and forwarding them to their respective entities 
for the service to be performed there. They just follow up on the progress and deliver it 
finalized to investors through the OSS. As explained by OSS Officer 1: 
Despite the fact that 47 ministries and governmental agencies are currently 
represented in GAFI, only a few have delegated the authority of making decisions 
and approvals to their representatives inside the OSS. The majority of 
representatives act as communication officers between the Authority and their 
ministries or entities; they do not have real powers. (May 2016) 
Having discussed the rationale behind the resistance and lack of coordination in 
the ‘IPA’s relationship with Government’ element, and reviewed the poor level of OSS 
performance in GAFI, the ability to enforce the provisions of the new law, whereby 
GAFI is empowered to issue operating licenses, is in question. According to Board 
Member 1, these provisions are inapplicable and “just added another additional layer on 
the OSS, which makes working directly with the licensing agencies easier to the investor” 
(July 2016). Similarly, Former Chairman of IDA views that this condition necessitates 
“reforming the mechanism of issuing permits from the roots, or else the OSS will be of no 
value” (August 2016). 
Additionally, in the same month of issuing the new Investment Law No.17/2015, 
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IDA prepared law giving it the right to regulate and grant operating licenses for industrial 
projects, in addition to allocating and disposing lands under its jurisdictional authority. 
Few months later, the Cabinet approved this law, ignoring the provisions of Law 
No.17/2015 and the authority given to GAFI by it. This provides clear evidence on the 
absence of coordination and communication between government agencies. Moreover, it 
reflects the entrenched centralized nature of the public administration system in Egypt, 
which resists any delegation of authority and views it as a tool to weaken their power, 
rather than to facilitate processes and accelerate procedures. It also points out to the 
individualistic perspective that some ministries and governmental entities adopt, instead 
of adopting a more collective, constructive view that contributes to an overall friendly 
climate for doing business and attracting investments. 
It also harms the image building efforts and sends a negative message to 
prospective and existing investors regarding the strength and applicability of the legal 
framework in Egypt and reflects the government's inconsistency. 
This situation further confirms that the top down approach of the government in 
dealing with this problem is not useful. “Cutting various state agencies and departments 
out of licensing procedures is simply unworkable in practice” (Former Principle Deputy 
Minister of Investment, August 2016). In addition, imposing a law without coordinating 
with the concerned parties would complicate rather than ease things. 
Therefore, success of the OSS system will only be achieved when GAFI becomes 
politically well positioned in the government and positively perceived by the different 
ministries. Only then, different political actors and key agencies will align their strategic 
directions to cooperate with GAFI rather than work in parallel. 
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 Business Matchmaking and After Care Services 
Mostly, IPAs conduct matchmaking activities to associate foreign investors with 
domestic investors and suppliers, aspiring to achieve a profounder integration of foreign 
investors into the local economy (Wells and Wint, 2000). In GAFI, matchmaking service 
is provided for new business or an established business that seeks expansion. It involves a 
process that starts with filling out an application, and occurs upon requests from 
investors, who fall under one of three categories; owns land but no funding or liquidity; 
owns land and factory, but needs technology or know-how; has an idea and needs 
everything. Promotion Officer 1 notes that, “the department matches either between local 
and foreign investors or two foreign investors. But mostly, foreign investors demand a 
match with another foreign investor because in their view, a foreign investor is easier to 
deal with than an Egyptian” (June 2016). 
Although there is a committed department to assist investors in finding investor-
matches, yet the interviews revealed that it operates unguided by a clearly defined linkage 
strategy or program. On one hand, this implies a weak performance from the department 
leading to low effectiveness of this service, which Promotion Officer 2 admits 
saying:“matchmaking is mostly a lengthy process that goes through many negotiations, 
and its results are not as hoped for”(June 2016). On the second hand, the absence of a 
defined strategy denotes a shortage in determining the main objective behind offering this 
service. A clear objective will devise strategies that would in turn transform into 
programs and activities. In this sense, the objective must be defined to largely contribute 
to Egypt’s overall investment promotion efforts and its national economic goals. 
The admitted weak performance in this service could be attributed to GAFI’s 
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weak relationship with private sector and the lack of involvement from GAFI’s board 
into the functioning of the Authority with regards to its promotional mandate. As well as, 
the lack of monitoring and follow up from GAFI’s leadership and executive Board. 
As for the aftercare services, literature and best practices explain that aftercare 
services are presented to investors who are in their post-establishment phase of a 
business, where they are seeking support in reinvestment, expansions or upgrading their 
existing project or business (Loewendahl, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007). However, GAFI’s 
Aftercare Services department assists investors in the entry and operation phases. 
Promotion Senior Official 1 justifies this saying that “the Promotion Division is the front 
office for investors and complaints are received by more than one division, so when the 
Aftercare Services Department receives a problem in any phase, it deals with it” (June 
2016).  
Similar to matchmaking, aftercare services are weakly performed as admitted by 
Promotion Official 1, saying that, “the aftercare dedicated staff do not perform this job in 
the appropriate manner”. Reasons for that include the weak allocated resources for the 
department, especially the human resource element where “aftercare personnel tend to 
be closer in style to governmental employees” (Senior Management Official, July 2016). 
In addition, the need for a call center and a smart Investment Information System (IIS) 
was stressed to help GAFI sort the complaints, and categorize them by division and 
department, so that each can deal with theirs accordingly. 
d. Policy Advocacy 
Effective IPAs are not only distinguished by their ability to attract FDI, but also 
with their strong role as advocates for improving the overall investment climate. Policy 
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advocacy is mainly concerned with pushing for better investment legislations and more-
friendly investment environment. Moreover, as indicated earlier in the Literature chapter, 
there is evidence that policy advocacy is the most positively correlated IPA function with 
respect to FDI inflows (Morrisset and Andrews Johnson, 2004). 
GAFI has an entire division titled ‘Investment Policies’ that works on the 
country’s micro indicators through 27 researchers 33 . The Division is mandated with 
analyzing all the laws related to investment in Egypt, and examining all international 
reports and surveys that are provided to GAFI via international organizations. It also 
prepares adequate sectoral studies on investment opportunities in each sector, but mainly 
gives the Doing Business Report of the World Bank an utmost attention, more than 
anything other task, as a Senior Policies Official acknowledged: 
The Doing Business Report is what we mostly care about in this division, even if 
we are sometimes not convinced with its results. Still, it is what investors rely on 
in making their investment decisions. Hence, we respond to the indicators and try 
to fix the areas, where the report highlights problems.(May 2016) 
Moreover, a ‘Coordinating Committee’ was formed by the Current Prime 
Minister to follow up on Egypt's ranking in the Doing Business Report in early 2016. The 
Committee
34
 is headed by the Minister of Investment, and includes all the relevant and 
involved ministries in improving and simplifying procedures at all business areas tackled 
                                                        
3390% of the researchers are graduates of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo 
University. Almost all of them are Master's degree holders, while half are PhDs holders. They attend 
international conferences and are being trained regularly. 
34The Committee’s first meeting was held in February, 2016, and was attended by the Ministers of 
Planning, Follow-up, and Administrative Reform; Electricity and Renewable Energy; Housing and Urban 
Development; and Trade and Industry; Governor of Cairo; representatives from Ministries of Justice and 
Finance; Head of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA); Chief Executive Officer of GAFI; 
the Egyptian Credit Bureau; and other officials from the Ministry of Investment and GAFI. 
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in the report. The first meeting resulted in an agenda on the short, medium, and long 
term-levels to improve Egypt’s rank, and “the collaboration of all the ministries and 
authorities to achieve more efficient processes that keep up with international standards 
is positive” (Senior Management Official, July, 2016). 
Despite the significant role GAFI plays by heading the Coordinating Committee 
and following up with all ministries for reaching a satisfactory business climate, yet 
GAFI did not have a loud voice in issuing the latest Investment Law No. 17/2015. Even 
though it had prepared a draft that was amended several times, GAFI was ignored and 
another version of the law was adopted despite the presence of disagreements and lack of 
consensus over several articles.  
The inability of GAFI to play a stronger role in advocacy can be ascribed to the 
several reasons. The first is the lack of political support it gets from decision-makers. 
Senior Management Official in GAFI stated that “the Authority does not get enough 
support from policymakers” (July 2016) in addition, its “relationship with the MoI is 
exactly like the relationship of any ministry with another; there is no relation” 
(Researcher in the Management Office, July 2016). Both of which are related to the legal 
status and political positioning of GAFI. FDI figures indicate that GAFI was strongest 
and most effective during the period between 2004 and 2009, when it enjoyed some 
autonomy, and its structure was closer to quasi-governmental rather than a pure-
governmental. Back then, GAFI was well positioned among the government institutions 
and was a key player in a broader policy process regarding investment, lobbying for 
reforming investment policies and laws. This justifies why major institutional and 
legislative reforms took place on the country level and inside GAFI and its OSS during 
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that period, and which were positively reflected in the advanced ranks Egypt has held at 
international reports and the highest FDI level that the country has achieved until today. 
The second reason relates to the inability of policy makers and GAFI’s leadership 
to prioritize functions and therefore allocate the necessary resources accordingly. Even 
though there is evidence that policy advocacy is the most associated function with more 
FDI, in addition it is the function that directly feeds the efforts of image building, GAFI 
prioritizes image building and investment generation functions over policy advocacy and 
investor servicing, which can be inferred by looking at the activities under the promotion 
line item in their budget. GAFI needs to give considerable attention to its role as an 
advocator and make sure its policy department is capacitated with highly qualified staff 
that are capable of analyzing and recommending policies that contribute positively to the 
decision making process. 
The third and last reason relates to the linkage to private sector and the weak role 
it plays in the functioning of GAFI. Strengthening and institutionalizing the relationship 
with the business communities and councils existing in Egypt will enable GAFI to clearly 
identify the problems in the investment climate from an investor point of view. Hence it 
will enhance its ability to provide effective feedback to government policy-makers 
regarding the enactment of investment friendly legislations and policies. Moreover, being 
backed by the private sector will strengthen GAFI’s position and allow it to play a more 
active advocacy role. 
This section has complemented the first one in offering a full institutional analysis 
for GAFI, where it explained the relationship between both organizational and functional 
elements. It further portrayed how GAFI performs each of the image building; investment 
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generation; investor servicing and facilitation; and policy advocacy functions, all of 
which that characterize the functional strength of an IPA.  
This chapter answered the main research question of this study, illustrating that 
the structure of GAFI does not contribute to its likelihood of being an effective agency 
promoting and facilitating investments in Egypt. The analysis shows how an effective 
structure is inextricably interdependent on both legislative and institutional factors, and 
portrays how the institutional elements in particular have been largely dependent on and 
shaped by the overall legislative framework of investment. It further shows that the Law 
No.17/2015 estranged both the business community and other government ministries, 
with regards to the one-stop shop and land allocation policies, which led to disagreements 
and divisions between GAFI and other ministries and agencies. All of which negatively 
influenced the ability of GAFI to streamline procedures and facilitate investment 
processes. 
The analysis also highlights other factors influencing the effectiveness of GAFI to 
attract more FDI. On top of these factors is the absence of a clear overarching economic 
vision for the country, which therefore, produced an ambivalent policy framework for 
investment. This blurry policy framework cannot help policy makers neither to identify 
priorities nor to evaluate policy challenges while seeking to attract more FDI that 
contributes to the sustainable development of the country and the economic wellbeing of 
its citizens. The Egypt Economic Development Conference can be a palpable 
demonstration to the consequences of not having a clear economic vision and a precisely 
outlined policy framework with regards to investment. There was a political buy-in 
during this period that promoting investment is a quick way for recovering the economy. 
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Moreover, a new investment law was just issued and the time was right for GAFI to play 
a more instrumental role, especially that the conference was successful and resulted in 
signing many millions-worth contracts and memorandums of understanding for projects. 
However, GAFI failed to play an influential role, and most of these projects have been 
halted because the government was unable to resolve the pressing investment problems 
and ministries did not have a clear reform agenda to act together upon. In addition, 
although the government has launched Egypt’s Sustainable Development Strategy 2030 
(SDS 2030) in February 2016, it is perceived as a weak, incomprehensive, and non-
detailed policy document that is full of parameters without signaling the implementation 
mechanisms. It was clear that Egypt has missed seizing the opportunity to capture and 
build on the momentum of the Conference to define a real economic vision and 
investment policy framework that guide and encourage further legislative and 
administrative reform. 
Another important factor would be the leadership of GAFI; most of the 
interviewees have expressed their concerns about the absence of a strong leadership that 
can achieve transformational change and lead the institution towards real and substantial 
outcomes through building a strong relationship and effectively communicating with the 
employees and other external stakeholders, understanding the context in which the 
investment promotion operates and adaptive towards the changing and fluctuating status 
of the economy in the country.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
I. Conclusion 
The main objective of this research was to portray a complete picture of GAFI’s 
potential to attract more investments. Although, there is no a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to 
follow, with respect to the most effective IPA structures, best practices and rigorous 
studies have verified a number of elements that highly influence the capacity of IPAs to 
perform their functions and hence impact their performance with regards to quantity and 
quality of FDI attracted. 
Based on this, an institutional analysis for GAFI was carried out, framing its 
structure’s potential in several organizational and functional elements. The findings 
reveal that its overall structure does not contribute to the likelihood of being an effective 
agency responsible for investment promotion and facilitation in Egypt. Hence significant 
changes and reforms are needed to improve its status quo and consequently contribute to 
enhancing the economic and social situation in the Egypt.  
The institutional analysis shows that GAFI’s legal status account for weakening 
its structure. The decree whereby GAFI is created does not support maintaining its 
stability. It was modified several times, resulting in affiliating GAFI with different 
ministries and ministers over the past 10 years. Therefore, its political position, degree of 
autonomy and authority were either reinforced or marginalized; only depending on the 
power of the entity or minister it is affiliated to. Accordingly, the legal status of GAFI 
impedes it from being positioned as a stable, soundly functioning agency. Moreover, as 
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per its relationship with government, the capacity of GAFI to promote for other 
ministries has always been constrained, when it follows a minister, unless this minister is 
influential. Its leverage becomes less among other governmental agencies and entities. 
Therefore, in Egypt, all other ministries are currently promoting to themselves. This 
results in a fragmented promotion effort, and an absence for a mechanism to promote one 
image to Egypt. 
Similarly, GAFI’s linkages with private sector are found only limited to 
incorporating private-sector members in its board of directors, despite the presence of 
many active business councils and organizations in Egypt. Moreover, even though 
GAFI’s Board of Directors enjoys having diverse and strong business representatives, 
their contribution in GAFI’s role as a promoter and an advocator for better policies is not 
significant. With regards to resources, GAFI is considered a strong economic entity, with 
abundance of financial resources. However, these resources do not appear well directed 
towards boosting the promotion efforts and enhancing the skills of the promotion staff. 
Calibers working on investment and facilitation lack talent and expertise, especially with 
regards to investor orientation, language skills and track record.  
Indisputably, the lack of effectiveness in the organizational elements is indicative 
to the deteriorated situation of the promotional functional elements. Scrutinizing how 
GAFI performs each of four IPA functions exposed the absence of an overarching 
economic vision and therefore a clear guiding investment promotion strategy, based on 
the country’s competitive strengths, which further informs on a lack of communication 
between GAFI and the governmental ministries and agencies. 
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This alone reveals that the four main IPA functions are carried randomly and in 
parallel, rather than prioritizing the functions that are more significant and contributing to 
the current political and economic situation of Egypt. The country suffered from political 
instability and insecurity after 2011 Revolution passing by 30 June in 2013 and toppling 
another regime. In addition, it is passing through another phase of economic instability 
due to unpredictability of fiscal policies. All of which are events that require the GAFI to 
prioritize the efforts towards the country’s “image building” and therefore, focus on 
policy advocacy and investors servicing functions that directly pour into branding Egypt 
as a favorable investment location.  
In terms of the legislative framework that governs GAFI, despite the new 
investment Law No.17/2015 provides investors with more incentives and guarantees 
regarding the facilitation of procedures, the Law complicated the process, especially with 
regards to obtaining the operating licenses and land allocation, as it adopted a top-down 
approach in imposing the amendments without considering or coordinating with the 
implementing agencies.  
Lastly, it is important to highlight that all reform initiatives must be backed by 
strong political will and consensus over investment priorities. Though this political will is 
present in the case of Egypt, yet it will not be effective unless it is translated into well-
defined strategy that guarantees the coordination of all government institutions, as well as 
private sector in a joint effort towards enhancing the overall investment climate. 
Moreover, this strategy will not be effectively implemented unless bounded by a clear 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism.  
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II. Recommendations  
The recommendations of this research are derived from synergy between the 
viewpoints of the interviewees and the analysis of the researcher, perceiving GAFI as a 
State agency that is complicated and tangled with other bureaucratic agencies. GAFI will 
not move forward without progressive reform, however, any attempt for dismantling and 
rebuilding it would be very difficult, given the State administrative apparatus, complexity 
of laws, centralized bureaucracy, and turf battles. The following points summarize a set 
of recommendations that could enhance the effectiveness of GAFI to propagate its 
promotion role:  
1. Legislative Aspects 
The following proposed recommendations are focusing on the overall legislative 
framework of investment in Egypt, and are not limited to the investment Law 
No.17/2015. 
 Efficient bankruptcy law must be issued to deal with the insolvency issues to 
facilitate the market entry and exit barriers for large and small investors.  
 Following a clear State’s economic vision, incentives in the investment law shall 
be identified per targeted sectors and industries, accompanied by other incentives 
offered to the local feeding industries. 
 Investment law must be amended to assign obtaining the licenses to third party to 
facilitate the operating business stage.  
 Abolish the MoI and only keep GAFI to overcome the redundant roles between 
both entities and reduce the bureaucratic layers. In addition, transform the 
institutional form of GAFI into a quasi-governmental rather than a purely 
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governmental institution and maintain its autonomy. This can be achieved 
thorough affiliating GAFI to either the President or the Prime Minister, in order to 
be insulated from the governmental agencies’ pressures and overlap. This will 
enable GAFI to situate itself in a non-threatening position, as a mediator between 
various investment opportunities of the different governmental agencies and FDI. 
2. Institutional Aspects 
 Ensure the separation between GAFI’s role as a regulator and executor on one 
side, and its role as promoter and facilitator on the other side, accordingly 
segregate the functions and powers of each. 
 Once the separation between the roles is completed, focusing on investment 
promotion can be an opportunity for GAFI to act as an agent for change that 
would help the promotion division move forward, and lead other divisions to 
change later. This requires: 
 Another layer of top management is completely dedicated only to 
enhancing the promotional role of GAFI. 
 This top management is suggested to be, one of the Deputy Chairmen to 
lead the restructuring of the division and to provide clear monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism that ensures promotion functions are carried out 
appropriately.  
 The Deputy Chairman can be assisted by business development top-notch 
calibers to assist him in developing a plan for promoting certain industries, 
based on Egypt’s competiveness in different sectors. This can be achieved 
through creating a scoring matrix for each sector to identify its drivers and 
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impediments for growth. This scoring matrix would be used as potential 
for cooperation with other governmental ministries and agencies to boost 
the drivers and abolish the impediments in each sector.  
 Based on the scoring matrix GAFI shall develop a National Investment Plan to 
be endorsed by all sectoral ministries. This plan should strategically focus on 
attracting FDI that contributes to the local economic development in the country.  
 The promotion division must be restructured and organized by economic sector. 
Also it must be mandated with clear responsibilities for country image building, 
investment generation, linkage promotion and policy advocacy. 
 Promotion division must have a separate budget that reflects the promotion 
functions, outlining the different activities under each. This would help GAFI to 
follow up and evaluate its performance in each of the functions.  
 Develop a capacity building plan for the promotion staff that would orient them to 
adopt a business-like culture that is more investor friendly.   
 Institutionalize relations with the various influential business councils and 
communities, as well as enhance the relationship with the governmental agencies 
and entities through a clear communication strategy. This can be accomplished 
through establishing two units, each of which is dedicated to strengthening and 
maintaining GAFI’s linkages to the private sector and its relationship with 
governmental entities.   
 GAFI should primarily focus its promotional efforts on image building and 
investor servicing. It should develop a well-articulated plan for branding Egypt, 
through an international campaign. This plan should tackle issues related to 
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security, economic stability, and foreign currency, beside demonstrating 
investment opportunities in different governorates & sectors. 
 The current economic condition of Egypt requires GAFI to direct its targeting 
approach towards interdependent industries that create synergy between the 
different sectors, and the export-oriented industries. 
 GAFI needs to play a stronger role as an advocator for better investment policies 
and climate. It should closely work with the aftercare and facilitation departments 
to identify the investors’ problems and solve them. GAFI should also have a clear 
mechanism for reporting, following up, and measuring the progress. 
 
All of these recommendations will enable the government to define the 
orientation of the Egyptian economy in terms of being an export-led or a consumer based 
or otherwise. This constitutes the solid ground for formulating robust policy framework 
for investment, based on which the policy-makers will be able to clearly set priorities, 
evaluate policy challenges, and direct their efforts and resources towards attracting FDI 
that contributes to the sustainable development of the country and the economic 
wellbeing of the citizens. 
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Annex 1 
Post-Establishment Services 
Governmental 
Services 
 
 Issue the residence permits and their renewals (1 year then renewed another 1 year 
then 3 years; depending on his seriousness in investment) 
 
 Issue work permits and their renewals for foreigners (1 foreigner for every 9 
Egyptians) 
 
 Give recommendation regarding bringing labor and dependents 
 
 Approve Foreign Companies Representative Offices and Branches (opening – 
modifying – closing) 
Technical 
Services 
 
 Ratifying importing and exporting invoices 
 
 Giving recommendations on custom duties regarding importing machines and 
equipment necessary for projects operation 
 
 Giving recommendations on getting exemptions from registration fees and taxes for 
land contract, mortgages, and loans 
Legal 
Services 
 
 Ratifying meeting minutes for either the board of directors or general assembly 
(ordinary or unusual)  
 
 Issuing decrees of the legal amendments in companies ’ articles of association 
 
 Modifying the company's form, name, type of activity, number of partners) 
 
 Closing of companies 
Publication 
Services 
 
 Publishing company's contracts, articles of association and any related legal 
amendments 
 
 Publishing special decrees and documenting copies of Investment Gazette to be 
ratified by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Tax 
Exemption 
Services 
 
 
 Forming committees, which determine date of business start up and its executive 
status and ratifying its reports. 
 
 Issuing certificate of tax exemption 
Source: Author, based on the interviews 
 
 
